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“HACKING” SERVICE OF PROCESS: USING SOCIAL MEDIA TO
PROVIDE CONSTITUTIONALLY SUFFICIENT NOTICE OF PROCESS
Angela Upchurch*
I. INTRODUCTION
On a fundamental level, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause requires that a defendant be provided with adequate notice of any
proceeding to be accorded finality.1 Since the Supreme Court announced the
modern standard for determining the constitutionality of notice in Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Co.,2 there have been many opportunities for
courts to determine whether newly conceived methods of service of process
are constitutionally sufficient. Entirely new means of communication have
been created and put into widespread use.3 As people have changed the way
they interact with each other and how they receive information, service
methods once perceived to be effective ways to communicate notice seem
less so.4
As our society has changed, we have witnessed revised application of
the principles of due process to court procedures. For example, personal
jurisdiction changed from a highly formalistic inquiry, focused on whether a
defendant was located within the territorial authority of a state,5 to a more
pragmatic inquiry focused on fairness and due process rights.6 Similar to the
evolution of the personal jurisdiction standard, the notice requirement has
been stretched since the time of Mullane as new communication tools such

*

Associate Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law. Thank
you to the University of Arkansas at Little Rock for the opportunity to present this work at its
Law Review Ben J. Altheimer Symposium, “Legal Hacking: Technology and Innovation in
the Legal Profession,” in February 2016, (http://ualr.edu/lawreview/home/symposiumseries/). Special thanks to Kent Markus and Susan Gilles, for their comments on early drafts,
and to Jayci Noble and Tess Shubert, for their valuable research assistance. Finally, thank
you to the Southern Illinois University School of Law for its financial support in writing this
project.
1. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
2. Id. at 314–315.
3. See Trisha Dowerah Baruah, Effectiveness of Social Media as a tool of communication and its potential for technology enabled connections: A micro-level study, 2 INT’L J. OF
SCI. & RES. PUBLICATIONS 1, 8–9 (2012) (discussing the impact of social media on the way
people communicate and process information).
4. See infra Part II (discussing the evolution of electronic service of process).
5. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1877).
6. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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as television, telex, and fax became available.7 What makes the current environment unique is the speed at which human communication is changing.8
Never before has communication changed so quickly and in a way accessible to the general public. Television and fax, while revolutionary in the way
they permitted people to send and access information, were largely tools that
few people had the ability to harness for purposes of notice.9 Social media,
by contrast, is a free medium, and the user can both receive and send information. Additionally, when coupled with the advancement of inexpensive
mobile devices and ready access to the internet, individuals can access social media tools wherever they go.10 The widespread accessibility of these
new technologies has radically altered the way in which people send and
receive information.11
Plaintiffs have long advocated for more efficient means of service of
process when a defendant attempts to evade service or when service of process through in-hand personal service would be too expensive or impractical. While in-hand personal service will remain the gold standard service of
process method, social media provides new avenues for achieving constitutionally sufficient notice. As such, service rules should be adopted that provide plaintiffs with a default option of service via social media while ensuring defendants’ constitutional rights are adequately protected. Additionally,
service rules should be adopted that permit the court to order service via
social media after considering the individual circumstances of the case. Finally, service rules should be adopted that facilitate securing the defendant’s
consent to service via social media.
This article explores the principles underlying the notice requirement
of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.12 Against this backdrop,
this article examines the unique challenges presented by service via social
media.13 This article proposes several legislative options that permit service
7. See infra Part II (discussing the evolution of electronic service of process).
8. See NICK COULDRY, MEDIA, SOCIETY, WORLD: SOCIAL THEORY AND DIGITAL MEDIA
PRACTICE 1-30 (2012) (discussing the impact of recent changes in the use of media on society), Baruah, supra note 3, at 4.
9. For example, while many people own television sets, most people cannot afford to
purchase television airtime. Therefore, for this medium, the messaging is only transmitted
one way.
10. A 2015 Pew Research Center Report found that “68% of U.S. adults have a
smartphone, up from 35% in 2011, and tablet computer ownership has edged up to 45%
among adults.” Monica Anderson, Technology Device Ownership, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 29,
2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/10/29/technology-device-ownership-2015/. Additionally, “86% of those ages 18-29 have a smartphone, as do 83% of those ages 30-49 and
87% of those living in households earning $75,000 and up annually.” Id.
11. See Baruah, supra note 3, at 4–5.
12. See infra Part II (discussing the evolution of notice jurisprudence in the U.S.); see
also infra Part III (discussing the principles underlying the due process notice requirement).
13. See infra Part IV.
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of process on individual defendants14 via social media,15 while upholding the
principles of due process and ensuring constitutional notice is provided to
the defendant. Ultimately, social media provides an efficient “legal hack”16
because, for some defendants, it is more likely to provide notice than other,
more traditional, methods of service.
II. THE HISTORY OF NOTICE AND SERVICE OF PROCESS IN THE UNITED
STATES
This section explores the evolution of the due process right to notice in
the American legal system. After addressing the basic attributes of notice,17
this section addresses the various methods for service of process that have
been adopted to accomplish notice and the constitutional analysis of these
methods.18 Interwoven in this section is an evaluation of the impact that
technological advances in communication have made on service of process.
Finally, this section compares the methods for service of process embraced
in the United States with service methods currently being used abroad.19
A.

The Basic Components of Notice

To enter a binding judgment against a defendant, he must be properly
notified of the claims against him.20 Notice is proper only when the method
14. This article is limited to a discussion of the service of process on individual defendants in civil actions. While service of process via social media on a corporation or entity
would, in some cases, pass constitutional muster, the pattern of use of social media by individuals differs from that of entities. This article focuses on the use of social media by individuals and argues for service rules built around these patterns of behavior. Additionally, this
article does not address service of process in class actions.
15. This article focuses on the use of social media by individuals and recommends service rules premised on the communication supported by social media platforms. This article
does not take a larger position on whether other forms of electronic communication, such as
email, can or should be used for service of process. However, the reasoning in this article
could be used to support more generalized service provisions aimed at all forms of electronic
service of process.
16. “Legal hacking” is a cultural reference to the growing movement to find creative
solutions to problems that lie at the intersection of law and technology. “Legal hackers spot
issues and opportunities where technology can improve and inform the practice of law and
where law, legal practice, and policy can adapt to rapidly changing technology.” LEGAL
HACKERS, www. https://legalhackers.org/ (last visited June 28, 2016). “Legal hacking” was
the focus of the UALR Bowen School of Law’s Ben J. Altheimer Symposium at which this
paper was presented.
17. See infra Section II.A.
18. See infra Section II.B.
19. See infra Section II.C.
20. While more than just proper notice is needed for a binding judgment, notice is an
essential part of ensuring that the defendant will be bound to the court’s judgment. Mullane v.
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for service of process21 is authorized by the jurisdiction and the service is
constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. A defendant who fails to appear after receiving proper notice will have a default
judgment entered against him.22 However, without proper notice, that judgment will be subject to collateral attack.23
In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., the Supreme Court
announced the modern-day test for the right to notice under the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause.24 Under Mullane, notice must be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections.”25 At a minimum, “the notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information” including the court where the action
is pending, the date by which the defendant must respond, and the consequences for failure to respond.26 Moreover, the notice “must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance.”27 Finally, the method for notice must amount to more than a “mere gesture;” rather, “[t]he
means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the
absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.”28 When such notice is
impossible or is not practicable, “the form chosen [must] not [be] substantially less likely to bring home notice than other of the feasible and customary substitutes.”29 Like other individual due process rights, the defendant
may waive his right to receive notice or may consent to a particular form of
notice.30
Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §1074 (4th ed. 2016).
21. In this Article, the term “service of process” will refer generally to the service initiating the lawsuit. In some jurisdictions, this includes service of the complaint and a summons.
This also be accomplished through the service of a notice, writ or other order. See Majorie A.
Shields, Annotation, Service of Process Via Computer or Fax, 30 A.L.R.6th 413 (2008).
22. WRIGHT, supra, note 20.
23. Id.; Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
24. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. While other procedural due process challenges have followed the balancing test announced in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976),
the Court held in Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167–68 (2002), that the Mullane
standard was applicable in determining whether notice was constitutional.
25. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. Because a civil court proceeding that will bind the defendant constitutes a deprivation of his constitutional right to property, the due process clause
is triggered. Id at 313.; see also WRIGHT, supra, note 20;8 RHONDA WASSERMAN,
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, 2261 (Jack Stark ed., 2004) (discussing the components of procedural due process analysis).
26. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314-15.
27. Id. at 314.
28. Id. at 315.
29. Id.
30. 62B AM. JUR. 2D Process § 288 (2016). Of course, a court may also consider the
sufficiency of service sua sponte. Id. Other groups of vulnerable defendants may be protected
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Applying Mullane, the Court has clarified that actual notice is not constitutionally required.31 It has been accepted practice, following Mullane,
when the defendant has actual notice, courts are often willing to overlook
technical defects in performance of service.32
B.

The Methods of Service of Process Employed by State and Federal
Courts

While state laws authorize a variety of methods for service of process
on individuals, and even vary in the operation of those methods, there are
several common categories of approved service methods that exist across
jurisdictions. This section will examine traditional methods of service used
in both state and federal courts33 before exploring new and emerging authorized methods for service of process.
1.

Traditional Methods of Service of Process
a.

In-Hand Personal Service of Process

In-hand personal service of process has always been considered a constitutional method of service and is commonly referred to as the “gold
standard” method.34 As such, every jurisdiction authorizes in-hand personal
from consent to less formal methods of service. Stephanie Francis Ward, Our Pleasure to
Serve You: More Lawyers Look to Social Networking Sites to Notify Defendants, A.B.A. J.
(Oct. 1, 2011 8:49AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/our_pleasure_to_serve_
lawyers_social_networking_sites_notify_defendants/ (discussing how some jurisdictions
might limit the ability to contract away the right to formal service of process in property
leases).
31. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 169–170 (2002).
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 2 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST.1982) (noting
that “in most jurisdictions the statutory provisions on notice-giving have gradually been
revised and reinterpreted to require less exacting compliance with technical formality. However, the statutes still may be construed as establishing a set of requirements as to noticegiving effort that go beyond those imposed by the Constitution.”); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 3 cmt. b (AM LAW INST.1982) (noting that “[t]he modern approach
to notice-giving attaches primary importance to actual notice and treats technical compliance
with notice procedures as a secondary consideration”).
33. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) provide a discrete list of approved
methods for service of process on an individual located in the United States. FED. R. CIV. P.
4(e). In addition to these methods, the FRCP incorporates any method authorized by the state
in which the case is filed or in which the defendant is served. Id. at 4(e)(1). Therefore, any
alteration made to the state service laws will automatically have some impact on the federal
courts.
34. WASSERMAN, supra note 25, at 130; Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339
U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (noting that “[p]ersonal service of written notice within the jurisdiction
is the classic form of notice always adequate in any type of proceeding.”).
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service of process on an individual defendant. It has become widely
acknowledged as synonymous with notice, so much so that it has become an
event engrained in our cultural experience and is often depicted in movies or
television shows.35
To accomplish in-hand personal service, the plaintiff must employ an
authorized server. Some jurisdictions limit servers to the sheriff (or other
state official) or to a licensed server,36 while other jurisdictions only require
that the server be an individual over eighteen-years-old who is not a party to
the suit.37 While all jurisdictions require in-hand service be made to the defendant personally,38 some states place limits on where or when service may
be made.39 Finally, service is considered valid even if the defendant ultimately does not accept the process papers from the server. Courts have upheld service on a defendant who refused to take physical possession of the
summons when the defendant was clearly apprised of the contents of the
process and the process papers are left near him or in a space he physically
controls.40
For the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in-hand personal service of
process was used in all cases where the court exercised in personam jurisdiction over the defendant.41 However, following the landmark Supreme
Court decision of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,42 in-hand personal
service of process was no longer required to maintain personal jurisdiction
over the defendant.43 Rather, in personam personal jurisdiction was established if the defendant had sufficient minimum contacts with the forum. 44
When in-hand service of process was no longer necessary to achieve in per35. Ronald J. Hedges et al., Electronic Service of Process at Home and Abroad: Allowing Domestic Electronic Service of Process in the Federal Courts, 4 FED. CTS. L. REV. 55, 73
(2010). In-hand service of process has even been the focal point for major motion pictures.
See PINEAPPLE EXPRESS (Sony Pictures 2008).
36. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 4(c)(1) (requiring “[s]ervice of all process shall be made by a
peace officer, by a person specially appointed by the Commissioner of Public Safety for that
purpose or, where a rule so provides, by registered or certified mail).
37. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(2) (stating that “[a]ny person who is at least 18 years old and
not a party” may serve the defendant with the summons).
38. Service on an appointed agent is also appropriate, but is typically considered in
separate provisions of service rules. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(2)(C).
39. Example exclusions include service to a defendant attending a worship meeting of a
religious organization, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1831 (West 2016), or service on a
defendant elector on the day of an election. Id.
40. See Steve Sowell, 10 Things I Wish Process Servers Knew, 87-OCT MICH. B. J. 30,
30–31; see 58 AM. JUR. 2D Notice § 28 (2016).
41. WASSERMAN, supra note 25, at 130. In personam personal jurisdiction is necessary
to impose personal liability on the defendant himself. Id.; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723
(1877).
42. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
43. Id.
44. Id.
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sonam personal jurisdiction, the states began to authorize other, more efficient, methods of service of process.
b.

Abode or Dwelling Service of Process

Many jurisdictions also authorized a form of substituted service45 of
process commonly referred to as abode or dwelling service. In this form of
service, the process typically is served on a resident in the defendant’s
dwelling. What constitutes a defendant’s “usual place of abode,” residence
or dwelling differs considerably across jurisdictions. However, a common
trend is to require some permanency by the defendant in the dwelling.46 A
goal of many service provisions is to ensure the service is delivered to the
place the defendant considers to be his “home” or “primary residence.”47
Another limitation often imposed focuses on who may accept this form
of service. For some jurisdictions, any competent resident will suffice.48 For
other jurisdictions, there is a more limited group of individuals who may be
served through dwelling service—often these limits focus on the age of the
individual accepting service or on the relationship between the individual
and the defendant.49
There is also a variation of service on a defendant’s dwelling known as
“nail and mail” service. Under this variation, the service is affixed to the
defendant’s dwelling and subsequently mailed to the defendant, usually via
certified or registered mail.50 For this form of dwelling service, the process
papers must be prominently placed at the dwelling so as to sufficiently alert
the defendant upon his return.51
45. Because this is a form of substitute service, some jurisdictions require the defendant
to demonstrate that personal service is not availing. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
415.20(b) (West 2016). Other jurisdictions do not require this intermediate showing and
permit the plaintiff to perform service on the defendant’s dwelling without first attempting
service on the defendant personally. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(2)(B).
46. Allen E. Korpela, Annotation, Construction of Phrase “Usual Place of Abode,” or
Similar Terms Referring to Abode, Residence, or Domicile, as Used in Statutes Relating to
Service of Process, 32 A.L.R. 3d 112 (1970).
47. For example, in some jurisdictions there is a presumption that the residence that
married spouses share is the residence that must be used when serving one of the defendant
spouses. Id. at § 9.
48. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(2)(B) (noting that service may be left with “someone of suitable
age and discretion who resides” at the defendant’s dwelling).
49. C.R.C.P. 4(e)(1) (noting that service may be left “with any person whose age is
eighteen years or older and who is a member of the [defendant’s] family”).
50. N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 308(4) (McKinney 2016).
51. Id. (requiring the summons to be affixed to the door); see J.R. Monaghan, Annotation, Place or Manner of Delivering or Depositing Papers, Under Statutes Permitting Service
of Process by Leaving Copy at Usual Place of Abode or Residence, 87 A.L.R. 2d 1163
(1963).
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Service via Mail

Another form of service that has been authorized in many jurisdictions
is service via mail. In many jurisdictions, service via mail must be performed by certified or registered mail.52 In other instances, service may be
performed via first-class mail, especially when the service by mail is being
used in conjunction with other forms of service.53
d.

Constructive Notice via Publication & Catch-All Provisions

Most jurisdictions provide for a constructive form of notice when it is
impracticable or impossible to serve the defendant in any other manner.
These methods almost always require court order. Despite being widely
recognized as unlikely to provide the defendant with actual notice,54 the
most common form of constructive notice is publication in a regularly circulating newspaper. Unfortunately, this form of service of process is not only
unlikely to reach the defendant, but also is costly for the plaintiff.55
Jurisdictions that have recognized the limitations associated with service via publication, have created “catch-all” provisions to strike a balance
between the plaintiff’s interest in efficient service methods and the defendant’s constitutional right to receive notice of the lawsuit.56 Under a “catchall” provision, the plaintiff can move the court to authorize any form of service that would otherwise be constitutional.57 To trigger these provisions, the
court must make a finding that the other methods authorized by the state
service rules would not bring home notice to the defendant.58
52. 58 AM. JUR. 2D Notice § 29 (2016). For a comparison of the operation of certified
and registered mail, see Irene A. Blake, Definitions of Certified Mail and Registered Mail,
THE HOUS. CHRON., http://smallbusiness.chron.com/definitions-certified-mail-registeredmail-40208.html (last visited June 22, 2016).
53. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 415.20 (West 2016) (permitting service via mail when service is also made at defendant’s office). But see Ann Varnon Crowley, Note, Rule 4: Service
by Mail May Cost You More Than a Stamp, 61 IND. L. J. 217 (1986) (discussing the challenges that ultimately led to the repeal of the former Rule 4 provision, which permitted service via
first class mail).
54. Alyssa L. Eisenberg, Comment, Keep Your Facebook Friends Close and Your Process Server Closer: The Expansion of Social Media Service of Process to Cases Involving
Domestic Defendants, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 779, 810–813 (2014).
55. Id.; Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 716 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) (noting that
publication of legal notice in “more widely circulated newspaper, like the New York Post or
the Daily News, might reach more readers, the cost, which approaches $1,000 for running the
notice for a week”).
56. N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 308(5) (McKinney 2016) (allowing the court to order any
manner of service if it first finds that service is impracticable under the traditional methods
set forth in the service statute).
57. Id.
58. Id.
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Electronic Service of Process

Technological advances provide new avenues for delivery of service of
process. Surprisingly, while communication through newly developing electronic media has been embraced in many other sectors, the federal and state
court systems have been relatively slow to adopt electronic communication
as a regular method for notice.59 In fact, while there are some state service
provisions providing for electronic service of pleadings and papers,60 there is
no state service provision that permits litigants to provide service of process
to individual defendants in the first instance, without a court order, via electronic means.61 Therefore, the movement towards electronic service of process has been observed primarily in two areas—the judicial application of
state catch-all service provisions, and in federal courts, when service is
made on a defendant living abroad.
In the context of state catch-all service provisions, the court is permitted to order any method of service that would meet the constitutional standard in Mullane.62 Because these provisions are structured to operate as backup methods, the court must make a finding that service through traditional
routes is impossible or impracticable. As a result, cases applying these provisions in the context of electronic service often focus on this initial finding
of impossibility or impracticability with less consideration of the “reasonably certain to inform” aspect of the Mullane standard.63
In the context of service on a defendant located in a foreign country,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3) permits the district court to order
any method of service that is not prohibited by international agreement and
otherwise meets the constitutional standard in Mullane.64 Similar to the state
“catch-all” provisions, Rule 4(f)(3) requires court approval of the service
requested.65 However, Rule 4(f)(3) does not require the court to make a find-

59. See Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, No. 11 CIV. 6608 (JFK), 2012 WL 2086950, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012) (noting that the request to permit service via Facebook was “unorthodox”).
60. NEB. CT. R. PLEADING. § 6-1105 (providing for electronic service of pleadings and
other papers).
61. Some jurisdictions are making it easier for plaintiffs to seek court order for electronic service of process. Stephanie Irvine, How Utah Makes Electronic Service of Process Work,
SERVE-NOW (May 24, 2016), https://www.serve-now.com/articles/2199/how-utah-makeselectronic-service-of-process-work.
62. N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 308(5) (McKinney 2016) (allowing the court to order any
manner of service if it first finds that service is impracticable under the traditional methods
set forth in the service statute).
63. See Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 716 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015).
64. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(3).
65. Id. (stating that service may include any method “as the court orders”).
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ing that service through other methods are impracticable or impossible prior
to ordering the requested form of service.66
a.

Telex and Facsimile

Some of the earliest forms of technology embraced as appropriate
methods for service of process include telex67 and facsimile transmissions.68
In New England Merchants National Bank v. Iran Power Generation &
Transmission Co.,69 an important early decision embracing electronic service of process, a federal court ordered service of process on Iranian defendants via telex when the American plaintiffs’ attempts to provide service via
other traditional methods were stymied by a breakdown in relations between
their respective countries.70 Rather than express trepidation at the prospect
of ordering this new form of service, the New England Merchants court proclaimed:
[c]ourts . . . cannot be blind to changes and advances in technology. No
longer do we live in a world where communications are conducted solely
by mail carried by fast sailing clipper or steam ships. Electronic communication via satellite can and does provide instantaneous transmission of
notice and information. No longer must process be mailed to a defendant’s door when he can receive complete notice at an electronic terminal
inside his very office, even when the door is steel and bolted shut. 71

Surprisingly, in the time following this key decision, the federal courts
were slow to embrace the use of new technologies as methods for providing
service of process. In fact, federal courts did not begin ordering service of

66. Id. The only limitation under Rule 4(f)(3) is that the method must not be prohibited
by international law. Id.
67. The telex is an older “system of communication in which messages are sent
over long distances by using a telephone system and are printed by using a special
machine (called a teletypewriter).” Telex, M ERRIAM -W EBSTER D ICTIONARY (11 t h
ed. 2015).
68. See generally John M. Murphy III, Note, From Snail Mail to E-Mail: The Steady
Evolution of Service of Process, 19 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 73, 83–87 (2004) (discussing the early evolution of electronic service of process).
69. 495 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
70. Id. at 76 (noting that the plaintiffs’ attempts at service were encumbered by the following circumstances: “the political climate in Iran, including what appears to be a breakdown in the postal service of Iran; the severance of diplomatic relations between Iran and the
United States and its concomitant tension and almost total lack of cooperation; and, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 et seq., which the defendants claim provides the ̔exclusive’ method by which the government of Iran, its agencies and instrumentalities, are to be served with process in a commercial litigation.”).
71. Id. at 81.
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process via facsimile (a technology similar to telex) until the early 2000s.72
Even after courts began to embrace the use of facsimile as an acceptable
means of providing service of process, it was with some reluctance. For example, while courts were willing to order service by facsimile when the defendants had used facsimile to communicate with the plaintiff on prior occasions, other courts declined to order service by this method when such use
had not been established.73
While service rules have been relaxed to permit service of other pleadings or papers (such as answers to discovery requests) via facsimile, 74 service of process via facsimile has never enjoyed widespread support in the
states. Absent express authorization or the inclusion of a “catch-all” provision, service of the summons via facsimile is not permitted.
b.

Email & Social Media

In another landmark decision, Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio International
Interlink,75 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
service of process via email was constitutionally sufficient.76 The plaintiff in
Rio sued the defendant, a foreign internet business entity, for trademark infringement.77 After traditional methods for service proved to be fruitless, the
plaintiff moved the district court to order alternate service via email, and the
district court granted the order. 78
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted the “dearth of authority” supporting
service of process by email; but the court ultimately concluded, not only was
72. Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., No. 02-CV-0133E(F), 2002 WL 1628933, at *3
(W.D.N.Y. May 31, 2002); Murphy III, supra, note 68 at 83–90 (discussing the early adoption of fax as a method for service of process by state and federal courts).
73. Nabulsi v. H.H. Sheikh Issa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, No. CIV.A. H-06-2683, 2007
WL 2964817, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2007) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ request to serve the
defendants via facsimile because there was no evidence that the defendants used the fax
number “to conduct business or receive important communications on a regular basis”).
74. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(b)(2)(E) (permitting service of pleadings and other papers “by
electronic means if the person [being served] consent[s] in writing”); see also WASH. SUPER.
CT. CIV. R. 5(b)(7).
75. 284 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002).
76. Id. at 1018.
77. Id. at 1012.
78. The district court also ordered service on a separate organization not named as a
defendant in the suit, IEC. IEC, an international courier, was occupying the last claimed
physical address for the defendant in the United States. The plaintiff had originally attempted
service on the defendant at the address now maintained by IEC. While IEC was not authorized to accept service on behalf of the defendant, it informed the plaintiff that it would forward the summons and complaint to the defendant’s Costa Rican courier. In addition, the
court ordered service via mail on an attorney who had inquired about the lawsuit on behalf of
IEC. Id. at 1013.
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service of process by email proper, “it was the method of service most likely
to reach” the defendant.79 The court noted that the defendant lacked a physical office and had structured its business around its internet-presence, promoting its email address as its “preferred contact information.”80 For these
reasons, the court held that service of process via email was reasonably calculated to apprise this defendant of the pendency of the lawsuit.81
Following the decision in Rio, several federal courts have ordered service via email on foreign defendants under Rule 4(f)(3).82 In those decisions,
the defendant’s prior use of email was an important consideration used to
support an order of alternative service via email. The courts reasoned that
prior use supports the conclusion that the defendant will likely receive the
email containing the summons and complaint.83
Similar results have been reached by state courts utilizing state “catchall” service provisions. Following the reasoning in Rio, a New York family
court ordered service of the divorce action via email in Hollow v. Hollow.84
Under the New York service rules, a court can order any constitutional
method of service so long as it finds that the traditional methods of service
would prove to be “impracticable.”85 The Hollow court made the initial finding that service would be impracticable by determining that the plaintiff’s
husband had relocated to Saudi Arabia and the wife’s attempts at securing
79. Id. at 1017.
80. Id. at 1018. The court explained that “RII structured its business such that it could be
contacted only via its email address. RII listed no easily discoverable street address in the
United States or in Costa Rica. Rather, on its website and print media, RII designated its
email address as its preferred contact information.” Id. (emphasis added).
81. Rio Prop., Inc., 234 F.3d at 1018.
82. Hydentra Hlp Int. Ltd. v. Porn69.org, No. CV15-00451-PHX DGC, 2015 WL
8064770, at *3 (D. Ariz. Dec. 7, 2015) (ordering service via email after finding that the defendant “conducts business through the internet” and “service through email will give defendant sufficient notice and opportunity to respond”); F.T.Comm’n. v. PCCare247 Inc., No.
12 CIV. 7189 (PAE), 2013 WL 841037, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013) (allowing service on
the defended via email and Facebook); Lipenga v. Kambalame, No. GJH-14-3980, 2015 WL
9484473, at *4 (D. Md. Dec. 28, 2015) (the plaintiff presented evidence that she had “electronically communicated” with the defendant in an attempt to negotiate a settlement of the
dispute); see also F.T.Comm’n. v. Pecon Software Ltd., No. 12 CIV. 7186 (PAE), 2013 WL
4016272, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2013) (ordering service via email on those defendants that
made “use of [the] email addresses in relation to the alleged scheme” and denying a request
to order service via email on a defendant who did not make such use of the proposed email).
83. Hydentra Hlp Int. Ltd., 2015 WL 8064770, at *3.
84. Hollow v. Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (Sup. Ct. 2002) (the court found “that
service directed to the defendant’s last known e-mail address as well as service by international registered air mail and international mail standard, is sufficient to satisfy the due process requirements”).
85. N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 308(5) (McKinney 2016) (allowing the court to order any
manner of service if it first finds that service is impracticable under the traditional methods
set forth in the service statute).
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international service proved to be fruitless.86 While attempting to locate the
husband to perform in-hand service of process, the wife communicated with
the husband via email. In one email correspondence, the husband informed
the wife, “I am a resident of Saudi Arabia and there’s nothing anyone can do
to me here.”87 After ruling that the “catch all” provision applied because of
the husband’s evasive conduct, the Hollow court concluded that service by
email would be constitutional under Mullane because the defendant had
continued to contact his family via email after his departure for Saudi Arabia.88
Despite the use of service via email following Rio, many courts continue to express concern over the use of email as a sole vehicle for service. As
a result, decisions granting a request for alternative service of process via
email often order a back-up method of service of process, including: regular
mail; certified or registered mail; fax; or publication.
In recent years, courts have been faced with requests to order alternative service via social media. In Fortunato v. Chase Bank U.S.A.,89 the thirdparty plaintiff, Chase Bank, moved the district court to order alternative
service via email and Facebook (along with other service methods) on a
domestic third-party defendant who was actively evading service of process.90 Chase Bank brought an impleader action against the estranged daughter of the plaintiff, arguing that she was liable to Chase Bank after fraudulently opening a credit card account in the plaintiff’s name. 91 Because the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) do not provide for service of process via email or Facebook, the district court relied on the service rules of
New York, which are incorporated through Rule 4(e).92
After finding the third-party defendant intentionally evaded service of
process, by providing fictional or out of date addresses at various points, the
Fortunato court considered whether service via email or Facebook would be
constitutional. The court expressed its concern about ordering service via
Facebook, noting that it was “unorthodox to say the least.”93 This concern
was heightened for the Fortunato court, because Chase Bank was not able to
confirm that the third-party defendant, in fact, maintained the Facebook account located.94 A similar concern was raised about the email associated
86. Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
87. Id. at 705.
88. Id. at 707–08.
89. Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, No. 11 CIV. 6608 (JFK), 2012 WL 2086950, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012).
90. Id. at *1–3.
91. Id. at *2–3.
92. Id. at *1.
93. Id. at *2.
94. Id. at *2 (the court noted its concern, explaining, “anyone can make a Facebook
profile using real, fake, or incomplete information, and thus, there is no way for the Court to
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with the Facebook profile; there was no evidence that the email was operational or accessed by the third-party defendant.95 Consequently, the court
ordered service of process via publication in a local newspaper. Perhaps
ironically, the court used the third-party defendant’s Facebook account to
determine in which newspapers to publish notice.96
Other courts have been more willing to consider service via social media when that service has been accompanied by other methods of service of
process. In Federal Trade Commission v. PCCARE247 Inc.,97 the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) moved the district court to order service by email
and Facebook on a defendant in a foreign country. The PCCARE247 court
held that service by email alone would be constitutional because the defendant “ran an internet-based business and used email frequently for communication.”98 The court also specifically noted that the defendant had used the
email addresses in connection with the scheme that formed the basis of the
FTC’s action and had even communicated with the court through one of the
email addresses.99
After holding that the proposed service via email was constitutional,
the PCCARE247 court turned to the issue of whether service via Facebook
was also constitutional. The court explained that the Facebook accounts
were connected with the email addresses known to be associated with the
defendants and with a website that was connected with the defendants’ actions in the underlying dispute.100 Moreover, the court noted that the Facebook accounts could be connected to the defendants because of the personal
information posted on the profile that was linked to known information
about the defendants and the connections between the account and other
known linked accounts.101 For all of these reasons, the court held that the
FTC had “demonstrated a likelihood that service by Facebook message
would reach the defendants.”102 Despite these determinations, the
PCCARE247 court cautioned that “service by Facebook is a relatively novel
confirm whether the Nicole Fortunato the investigator found is in fact the third-party Defendant to be served”).
95. Fortunato, 2012 WL 2086950, at *2.
96. Id. at *8–10.
97. FTC v. PCCARE 247 Inc., No. 12 CIV. 7189 (PAE), 2013 WL 841037 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 7, 2013).
98. Id. at *13. (explaining that the “FTC has, therefore, demonstrated a high likelihood
that defendants will receive and respond to emails sent to these addresses” and “[s]ervice by
email alone, therefore, would comport with due process”).
99. Id.
100. Id. at *16. In fact, the defendants use the Facebook pages to advertise their business.
Id at *6.
101. Id. (stating the Facebook account was linked via a “friend” request to another known
person who was linked to the defendant outside of Facebook).
102. Id.
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concept, and that it is conceivable that defendants will not in fact receive
notice by this means.”103 For this reason, the court emphasized that service
by Facebook was being used as a way to “backstop the service upon each
defendant at his, or its, known email address.”104 After expressing these
words of caution, the PCCARE247 court encouraged courts to continue to
embrace new technology when considering whether to authorize new methods for service of process, saying, “history teaches that, as technology advances and modes of communication progress, courts must be open to considering requests to authorize service via technological means of then-recent
vintage, rather than dismissing them out of hand as novel.”105
Following the PCCARE247 decision, other courts approved service via
social media when it accompanied service via email or mail. In each of these
decisions, the court required some proof that the defendant owned the social
media account and made regular use of it. For example, in WhosHere, Inc.,
v. Orun,106 the plaintiff presented evidence that the defendant had referred
plaintiff to his social media accounts that bore the defendant’s name and
identifying information.107 Finally, the plaintiff introduced evidence that the
defendant had made regular and recent use of the social media accounts,
even identifying himself as a “mobile technology enthusiast” on one account.108 Based on this evidence, the court found that the collective service
attempts to the defendant’s two email accounts and two social networking
accounts would provide the defendant with sufficient notice of the litigation.109
Even when the defendant has not made clear use of email and social
media, courts have ordered service via social media as a “backstop” to other
service methods. For example, in Ferrarese v. Shaw,110 the court authorized
service of process via email and Facebook as backstop methods to service
by certified mail with a return receipt requested to the defendant’s last
known address and to the defendant’s sister at the same address.111 The defendant in Ferrarese actively evaded service by using multiple fictitious
names.112 Those efforts stymied the plaintiff’s ability to verify the email and

103. PCCare247 Inc., No. 12 CIV. 7189 (PAE), 2013 WL 841037 at *5.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. WhosHere, Inc., v. Orun, No. 1:13-CV-00526-AJT, 2014 WL 670817 (E.D. Va.
Feb. 20, 2014).
107. Id. at *4. The plaintiff introduced the defendant’s emails, and made explicit reference to his social media accounts.
108. Id. at *4–5 n.9.
109. Id. at *4.
110. 164 F.Supp.3d 361 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2016).
111. Id. at 367–68.
112. Id. at 363–64, 367.
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social media accounts.113 Because the email and social media account service was only being used to supplement the other forms of service, the court
was more willing to authorize its use.114
Recently, courts have addressed whether service through social media
alone would be constitutional. In 2015, a New York Supreme Court ordered
service of a divorce summons via Facebook private message in Baidoo v.
Blood-Dzraku.115 The Baidoo court accepted the plaintiff’s affidavits verifying the Facebook account belonged to the defendant by affirming that the
photographs associated with the account were that of the defendant.116 Additionally, the plaintiff attached copies of exchanges between herself and the
defendant on the Facebook account.117 This collective information about the
Facebook account supported the court’s determination that the Facebook
account belonged to the defendant and that he regularly logged into the account.118 Based on these findings, the Baidoo court held that service through
the Facebook account was constitutional under Mullane.119
In determining whether to order an additional “backstop” method of
service, the Baidoo court reasoned that the plaintiff did not have any other
method available to her.120 For example, the defendant did not have an email
address121 and his last known physical address was over four years old.122
Finally, the Baidoo court addressed why it decided to award service via Facebook rather than publication in a local newspaper. Specifically, the court
explained that it determined the Facebook service would be more likely to
reach the defendant. It stated, publication “is almost guaranteed not to provide a defendant with notice of the action for divorce.”123 Additionally, the
court was troubled that publication notice would impose significant costs on
the plaintiff.124

113. Id. at 364.
114. Id. at 367–68.
115. 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 716 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015).
116. Id. at 714–15.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 716.
120. Id. at 712.
121. Baidoo, 5 N.Y.S.3d at 714–15. The court did not explain why the plaintiff was not
able to identify an email account through the defendant’s Facebook account, but it was presumably because Facebook has recently changed to hide this information unless the account
holder agrees to release it.
122. Id. at 715.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 716. The court explained that “a more widely circulated newspaper, like the
New York Post or the Daily News” would cost approximately “$1,000 for running the notice
for a week” and “the chances of it being [sic] seen by defendant, buried in an obscure section
of the paper and printed in small type, are still infinitesimal.” Id.
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To accomplish service, the Baidoo court ordered the plaintiff’s attorney
to send the defendant the divorce summons by using a private message
through Facebook. The attorney was instructed to “log into plaintiff’s Facebook account and message the defendant by first identifying himself, and
then including either a web address of the summons or attaching an image of
the summons.”125 The service was to be repeated “once a week for three
consecutive weeks or until acknowledged by the defendant.”126 After the
initial message, “[the] plaintiff and her attorney [were] to call and text message defendant to inform him that the summons for divorce has been sent to
him via Facebook.”127
In 2016, in St. Francis of Assisi v. Kuwait Financial House, a federal
district court permitted service on a foreign defendant solely through the use
of his Twitter account.128 The court applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(f)(3), which permits service on an individual in a foreign country when the
service meets the Mullane standard and the method of service is not prohibited by international agreement.129 The plaintiff was unable to locate the
defendant, a Kuwaiti national, despite using a skip trace.130 In ordering service via Twitter, the court noted that the defendant made regular use of his
Twitter account; his account had a “large following,” and he used it to
“fundraise large sums of money for terrorist organizations by providing
bank-account numbers to make donations.”131 Given the defendant’s active
use of Twitter to communicate with others and the inability to locate the
defendant, the court found that service via Twitter would not only be “reasonably calculated to give notice” to the defendant, it would also be “the
‘method of service most likely to reach’” the defendant.132
C.

Service via Social Media in Foreign Countries

While service of process via social media may still be viewed as “unorthodox” by courts in the United States, foreign court systems have been
more willing to order service of process via social media. In 2008, an Australian court entered a default judgment for a lender against the defendant
mortgagees after they defaulted on their loan.133 While under Australian law,
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 716.
Id.
Baidoo, 5 N.Y.S.3d at 716.
No. 3:16-CV-3240-LB, 2016 WL 5725002 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2016).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Nick Abrahams, Australian court serves documents via Facebook, THE SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD (December 12, 2008), http://www.smh.com.au/news/technology/web/
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the default judgment was to be served on the defendants through personal
service; the lender, however, was unable to effect service on the defendants
after eleven attempts.134 After the lender’s lawyers were able to confirm the
defendants’ Facebook accounts through personal information posted to the
account, the court ordered substituted service on the Facebook accounts.135
Citing to the Australian decision, a New Zealand court ordered service
via email and Facebook on a defendant who could not be located for personal service.136 In its decision, the New Zealand court pointed to the defendant’s prior communications with the plaintiff via email and the fact that defendant was known to have a Facebook account as grounds for why substituted electronic service was warranted.137
Courts in Canada138 and South Africa139 have also awarded service of
process via Facebook. Recently, a court in the United Kingdom ordered
service of an order of injunction via Twitter.140 These decisions represent a
growing consensus that service via social media, at least in certain instances,
is a valid and reliable form of notice.

australian-court-serves-documents-via-facebook/2008/12/12/1228585107578.html;
CPB
Lawyers, Substituted Service of Legal Documents via Facebook: “Like” or “Unlike” by
Australian Courts, LEXOLOGY (December 13, 2012) http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1e184550-fa73-4c6c-bc6d-b5a160fab4b9.
134. Noel Towell, Lawyers to service notices on Facebook, THE SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD (December 16, 2008), http://www.smh.com.au/news/technology/biztech/lawyers-toserve-notices-on-facebook/2008/12/16/1229189579001.html.
135. CPB Lawyers, Substituted Service of Legal Documents via Facebook: “Like” or
“Unlike”
by
Australian
Courts,
LEXOLOGY
(December
13,
2012)
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1e184550-fa73-4c6c-bc6d-b5a160fab4b9.
However, in Citigroup v Weerakoon, an Australian court denied a motion to serve defendant
via Facebook after noting lack of certainty that the Facebook was the defendant’s account. Id.
136. You’ve been served–on Facebook, TECHNOLOGY (March 16, 2009, 2:29 PM),
http://www.stuff.co.nz/technology/2266647/You-ve-been-served-on-Facebook.
137. Id.
138. Lisa McManus, Service of Process Through Facebook, LEXISNEXIS LEGAL
NEWSROOM, (Nov. 9, 2011) https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/lexis-hub/b/legaltechnology-and-social-media/archive/2011/11/09/service-of-process-through-facebook.aspx
?Redirected=true (discussing a Canadian court’s decision to allow service via Facebook and
notice to the defendant’s HR department where the defendant had formerly worked).
139. Lee Swales, Serving Legal Process via Facebook and Social Media, SOC. MEDIA
AND REG. L. (Nov. 8, 2012) http://www.regulatorylawsa.com/2012/11/serving-legal-processvia-facebook-and.html (discussing the Kwa-Zulu Natal High Court’s decision to allow service via Facebook).
140. Matthew Jones, UK Court orders writ to be served via Twitter, REUTERS:
TECHNOLOGY (Oct. 1. 2009, 5:29 PM) http://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-twitter-lifetech-idUSTRE5904HC20091001.
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III. DECONSTRUCTING THE MULLANE STANDARD: THE PRINCIPLES
UNDERLYING THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT
This section begins with a call to ground any discussion of appropriate
methods of service of process in the principles of due process. After presenting the justification for such an approach, this section details the underlying
due process principles of the notice requirement.
A.

The Need for a Principled Approach in a Time of Technological Advance

Much of the current literature critiquing electronic service of process
focuses on how each particular tool—Facebook or Twitter—meets, or fails
to meet, the Mullane standard.141 This piecemeal approach to examining
service of process is largely inefficient and fails to place service via social
media in a larger constitutional context.
First, the Mullane Court always intended the consideration of new service methods to remain grounded in the larger context of the principles of
due process.142 The Mullane Court rejected piecemeal formulation of rules;
instead, it provided a test based on the principles of due process, intending
that test to be applied to new methods of service.143 While the Mullane test
might invite an overly fact-intensive inquiry into each possible service option, as has been seen in the context of electronic service of process, the
Mullane Court itself applied the principles of due process to recognize the
constitutionality of categories of process methods. For example, the “gold
standard” of notice—in-hand personal service of process—was heralded as a

141. See Pedram Tabibi, Esq., Facebook Notification - You’ve Been Served: Why Social
Media Service of Process May Soon Be a Virtual Reality, 7 PHX. L. REV. 37 (2013) (focusing
on Facebook); William Wagner & Joshua R. Castillo, Friending Due Process: Facebook as a
Fair Method of Alternative Service, 19 WIDENER L. REV. 259 (2013) (focusing on Facebook);
Keely Knapp, Comment, #serviceofprocess @socialmedia: Accepting Social Media for Service of Process in the 21st Century, 74 LA. L. REV. 547 (2014)(focusing primarily on Facebook); Eisenberg, supra note 54 (focusing on Facebook); Kevin W. Lewis, Comment, EService: Ensuring the Integrity of International E-Mail Service of Process, 13 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 285 (2008) (focusing on email); Svetlana Gitman, Comment,
(Dis)service of Process: The Need to Amend Rule 4 to Comply with Modern Usage of Technology, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 459 (2012) (focusing on email); Claire M. Specht, Comment, Text Message Service of Process-No LOL Matter: Does Text Message Service of Process Comport with Due Process?, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1929, 1929 (2012) (focusing on text messaging).
142. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
143. Id. (affirming that “[t]he Court has not committed itself to any formula achieving a
balance between these interests in a particular proceeding or determining when constructive
notice may be utilized or what test it must meet”).
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presumptively constitutional form of service.144 It is important to note that
the Mullane Court did not delve into an individualized critique of in-hand
service of process, but rather embraced this method as categorically constitutional.145
Second, a piecemeal approach that focuses on the particular operation
of an individual social media tool has limited application. Technology is
rapidly changing; not only are new social media tools being created, but the
ways in which “standard” tools, such as Facebook, are used, is constantly
changing. As an example, in recent years, Facebook has changed aspects of
its messaging service. Now users can receive “read receipts” alerting them
when another user reads their private message.146 For scholars and courts
concerned with the existence of a “read receipt,” this change could radically
impact their recommendations or future opinions.147 By focusing on the operations of current electronic tools, any recommendation or holding has a
short-lived utility. Additionally, the jurisprudence of notice is deprived of
useful analysis that is not confined to the features of a particular communication tool. Because the law of notice is being made in a time where the
medium of communication is changing at record pace,148 it is more advantageous to focus on identifying the principles underlying the due process notice requirement. Using these guiding principles, generalized recommenda144. Id. at 313 (noting that “personal service of written notice within the jurisdiction is
the classic form of notice always adequate in any type of proceeding”).
145. Id. For example, the Court did not examine limitations to personal service of process
that may exist in a particular case such as fraudulently luring a defendant into the forum to
achieve service. While service under these circumstances would not be constitutional, the
Court focused on a more generalized view of personal service in the context of the principles
of due process.
146. How do I know if a friend has seen a message I sent?, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/help/ipad-app/316575021742112 (last visited June 22, 2016).
147. Early commentary on the propriety of service via email focused on the ability to
confirm receipt of the email via a “read receipt.” See Yvonne A. Tamayo, Catch Me If You
Can: Serving United States Process on an Elusive Defendant Abroad, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
211, 229 (2003); Matthew R. Schreck, Preventing “You’ve Got Mail” from Meaning “You’ve
Been Served”: How Service of Process by E-Mail Does Not Meet Constitutional Procedural
Due Process Requirements, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1121, 1135–36 (2005); Hedges, supra
note 35, at 63.
148. There are over 1.5 billion monthly active users of Facebook. Number of monthly
active Facebook users worldwide as of 1st quarter 2016 (in millions), STATISTICA,
http://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-usersworldwide/. In the U.S., twenty percent of all time spent on personal computers and thirty
percent of time spent on mobile devices is spent on social media. Helen A.S. Popkin, We
spent 230,060 years on social media in one month, CNBC: TECHNOLOGY (Dec. 4, 2012)
http://www.cnbc.com/id/100275798. People are spending on average 1.72 hours on social
media each day. Jason Mander, Daily time spent on social networks rises to 1.72 hours,
GLOBALWEBINDEX (Jan. 26, 2015) http://www.globalwebindex.net/blog/daily-time-spent-onsocial-networks-rises-to-1-72-hours.
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tions can be derived which then can be applied to future possible electronic
service methods. This approach will provide more guidance to courts in the
changing technological climate and permit the development of a more cohesive body of law.
Finally, by failing to take a principle-driven approach, judicial committees and legislatures are deprived of guidance on how to revise the service
rules, and courts are left to wade in uncertain waters. As a result of this uncertainty, courts have expressed strong reservation in approving new methods of service of process.149 While there have been some isolated legislative
revisions to service rules to account for electronic service of process,150
these advances have generally not included newer tools such as social media.151 The vast majority of cases addressing electronic service of process
have been on a case-by-case approach under a “catchall provision” included
in service rules.152 While “catchall provisions” are useful for courts attempting to create a method of service in an unusual situation, the widespread use
of electronic communication such as email and social media suggest that
they will become a common way to locate and communicate with proposed
defendants.153 As such, there should be more guidance in the service rules on
how to appropriately effectuate service through these methods.
For these reasons, the following section offers an approach to analyzing the due process notice requirement that is grounded in the underlying
principles of procedural due process. These shared notions of due process,
though sometimes implicit, are present throughout modern notice jurisprudence.154 In this section, the principles underlying the due process notice
149. Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, No. 11 CIV. 6608 JFK, 2012 WL 2086950, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012) (noting that the request to permit service via Facebook was “unorthodox”); F.T.Comm’n. v. PCCare247 Inc., No. 12 CIV. 7189 (PAE), 2013 WL 841037, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013) (rejecting service via social media as a sole means of providing
notice because of its novelty); WhosHere, Inc. v. Orun, No. 1:13-CV-00526-AJT, 2014 WL
670817, at *4 (E.D. Va. Feb. 20, 2014).
150. While Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, permits parties to move the court
for alternative service methods, the court webpage explains that this can include social media.
Motion
for
Alternative
Service,
UTAH
COURTS
(April
26,
2016)
https://www.utcourts.gov/howto/service/alternate_service.html (last visited June 23, 2016).
151. While catch-all provisions permit the court to fashion any form of constitutional
service, they are not specifically directed at social media. In 2013, Texas legislators introduced a bill that would have affirmatively provided for service of process via social media so
long as the parties sought prior court approval. H.B. 1989, 83rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2013).
Ultimately, the bill was unsuccessful.
152. Supra Section II.B.2 (discussing the use of catch-all provisions to order service via
social media).
153. See Baruah, supra note 3, at 1–10 (discussing the impact of social media on the way
people communicate and process information).
154. Wasserman, supra note 25, at 132–33 (describing the Mullane test as based on “general principles” gleaned by the Court from precedent and “disjunctive”).
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requirement are identified, examined, and applied to the context of service
of process via social media.
B.

The Underlying Principles of Notice

Common throughout modern constitutional analysis of the notice requirement are several recognizable principles which serve as benchmarks to
judge the sufficiency of the proposed method of service of process. While
these norms are not always clearly articulated by courts, they are woven
throughout notice jurisprudence.
1.

The Method of Service Must be Directed at the Correct Defendant

The due process clause provides an individualized right to notice of a
proceeding that will bind the individual to an adverse judgment.155 The purpose of this notice is to provide the individual with an opportunity to be
heard and present a case in opposition to the claims asserted against him, or
choose not to do so and accept the judgment.156 Given the individualized
nature of the right to be heard, the plaintiff must serve the correct defendant
and direct service (or provide service directly) to the named defendant.157
Service provided to an incorrect defendant, either by misnaming the defendant or providing service incorrectly directed at the defendant, is insufficient.158 When the plaintiff becomes aware of these errors, the service rules
often provide ways for her to correct the service by amending her summons
or requiring her to get a new summons and perfect service of process.159 For
example, a plaintiff might become aware that she named the wrong defendant or that the address at which she was attempting service was incorrect
(either because the server was unable to locate the defendant or her attempt
to serve by mail was returned).160 In each of these situations, the plaintiff
must work to correct the service or she will not be able to secure a binding
155. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
156. Id.
157. See J.E. Keefe, Jr., Annotation, Necessity, in Service by Leaving Process at Place of
Abode, etc., of Leaving a Copy of Summons for Each Party Sought to be Served, 8 A.L.R. 2d
343 (1949) (noting that even when serving multiple defendants who reside at the same dwelling, “a copy of the summons must be left for each defendant”).
158. See 62B AM. JUR. 2D Process § 88 (explaining that while a misnaming of the defendant can be corrected by amendment of the summons even after a judgment is entered, the
court cannot amend the summons after judgment to include the name of a defendant who was
not named and not served).
159. Id.
160. See 62B AM. JUR. 2D Process § 83 (explaining “the test is whether the plaintiff had
in mind the person who was actually served and merely made a mistake as to the name or
whether the plaintiff actually meant to serve and sue a different defendant”).
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judgment against the defendant. The fact that service rules provide for these
types of alterations reinforces the need to provide sufficiently directed individualized service—the mere fact that such service may be difficult to accomplish is not enough to obviate the importance of this aspect of notice.
While individualized notice directed at the defendant is clearly constitutional, the Mullane Court offered some instances where less individualized
and less directed notice would also be considered constitutional.161 The Mullane Court focused on the balance of interests at play, a hallmark of procedural due process review. The individual’s right to notice of the proceeding
on the one hand, is essential to the exercise of his opportunity to be heard.162
On the other hand, the state has a strong interest in providing a final, binding
remedy to the plaintiff.163 The Mullane Court reasoned that the individual’s
right to notice is sufficiently weighty that some costly or time consuming
processes are warranted to guarantee proper notice.164
There are times, however, when this type of individualized notice is not
possible or practicable. The Mullane Court recognized this possibility and
provided some room for a less individualized form of notice to pass constitutional muster.165 The Court cautioned against a relaxed interpretation of
the procedural due process clause by mandating the plaintiff must use good
faith in securing proper service to the defendant.166 Namely, the Court countenanced against service that amounted to a “mere gesture.”167 Rather, the
service must be that which “one desirous of actually informing the absentee
might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.”168
In addition to the challenge of identifying the defendant, there are also
times when being able to direct service at the defendant poses a significant
hurdle to a plaintiff. Sometimes a defendant may not be easy to locate. For
example, some defendants do not have a permanent address or have recently
moved. Other times, defendants actively work to conceal their whereabouts
161. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
162. Id. at 314.
163. Id. at 311 (explaining that the state was interested in “the right of its courts to adjudicate at all against [those defendants] who reside” outside of the state).
164. Id. at 315–18 (requiring more than publication for defendants that could be identified).
165. Sometimes a defendant may not be identifiable, making individualized notice impossible. In Mullane, several of the beneficiaries were not identifiable because they only had
interests that would have vested at a future event or they were not sufficiently identified to
enable individualized notice. Id. at 317. Other times, the identification of the defendant may
be impracticable. For example, in Mullane, the very nature of the common trust drew many
smaller trusts, many with numerous beneficiaries that were too difficult to identify by name
because of the sheer volume of potential beneficiaries and the cost and labor that such identification would require. Id. at 317–18.
166. Id. at 315.
167. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315.
168. Id.
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to avoid being served with process. When the failure to locate the defendant
is occasioned by the defendant’s own evasive or deceptive behavior, courts
have been more willing to permit the plaintiff to use alternative, less directed methods of service.169 However, when the defendant has simply been
difficult to locate, the courts have been reticent to relax the obligations imposed by individualized and directed service of process.170 This restrictive
interpretation of the constitutional obligation of notice means that, at times,
the court has rejected the plaintiff’s attempts at service.171 Other times, this
means a plaintiff with a difficult to locate defendant will be required to either petition the court to approve another form of service of process or will
be required to provide ineffective and expensive service via publication.172
When considering how much to relax the requirement that notice be
both individualized and directed at the defendant, courts have also acknowledged the protective measures that are present in certain cases that bolster
the defendant’s opportunity to be heard. For example, when the defendant’s
interests are sufficiently aligned with other named parties who can be more
easily provided sufficient service of process, there is less concern that the
defendant who is not provided with individualized and directed service of
process will not have his defense presented to the court. 173 This is because
the defendants served with more reliable methods of service of process are
likely to come to court to present the very arguments the difficult to locate
defendants might have presented. When this is coupled with challenges to
providing the individual with direct service of process, the constitutional
balance present in Mullane is met.174

169. Lavery v. Lopez, 517 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (1987) (holding the defendant was estopped from challenging deficiency in service when the defendant intentionally provided
plaintiff with an incorrect address at the scene of the accident which was the basis of the
action).
170. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317 (rejecting service through publication on defendants who
could be identified and served via mail); Steward v. Kuettel, 2014 Ark. 499, at 9, 450 S.W.3d
672, 677 (rejecting service through email even though defendant was an out of state resident
who allegedly libeled plaintiff online and could not be located to serve via mail).
171. Kuettel, 2014 Ark. 499, at 9, 450 S.W.3d at 677.
172. Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, No. 11 CIV. 6608 JFK, 2012 WL 2086950, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012) (rejecting electronic service of process request and ordering service
by publication).
173. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319 (noting that the interests of the defendants who would not
receive more directed service “[did] not stand alone but [were] identical with that of a class”).
174. Id.; see also Wasserman, supra note 25, at 148–154 (discussing notice in the context
of class actions); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era
of the Nationwide Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2036 (2008) (discussing notice
after the Class Action Fairness Act).
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Notice Must Be Conspicuous

Another key principle underlying the constitutional jurisprudence of
notice is the conspicuousness of service of process. In addition to ensuring
that the proper information is conveyed to the defendant, it must be conveyed in a manner that is “reasonably calculated” to “apprise” him of his
rights.175 The Mullane Court opted to avoid a rigid test on what this actually
requires of a plaintiff. However, when one observes the aggregate of case
law on the sufficiency of manner of notice, it is clear, to “apprise” a defendant of a proceeding against him, the notice must make him aware of the proceeding and must prompt him to seize his opportunity to be heard on the
matter. 176
Awareness of a proceeding can be accomplished so long as the manner
utilized for service of process provides the necessary components of notice—providing the name and location of the court, the statement of the
claims asserted against the defendant, and the date and time he is to appear.
A plaintiff could fail to make a defendant aware of the proceeding if she
provides service of process in a manner that the defendant will not, or cannot, receive.
The awareness of the notice itself is often the focal point of cases discussing constructive methods of service of process such as publication or
service via postings to a structure. In part, this is because constructive methods are likely to never make their way to the defendant. Even the Mullane
Court noted how unlikely it is for a defendant to observe a printed notice in
a circulating publication.177 As readership in printed publications continues
to decline, this method of notice will become an even less effective way to
ensure a defendant is made aware of a proceeding against him.178
The inability to make the defendant aware of a proceeding is not a defect limited to notice via publication. In Greene v. Lindsey,179 the Court
struck down service in an eviction proceeding as unconstitutional when it
was provided via posting on the tenants’ doors.180 While this method was
statutorily approved, the Court explained that it was not constitutional be175. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
176. Id. (holding that all relevant required information about the proceeding should be
included); 62B AM. JUR. 2D Process § 59 (summons should “clearly inform[] the defendant
that he or she is the intended defendant” and “inform[] the defendant of the nature of the
proceedings and of the court where the hearing will be held”).
177. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315 (noting that it would be “idle to pretend that publication
alone . . . is a reliable means of acquainting interested parties of the fact that their rights are
before the courts”).
178. Eisenberg, supra note 54 (discussing the challenges to print publication as a method
of service).
179. 456 U.S. 444 (1982).
180. Id. at 453.
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cause it was not likely that the notice would come to the attention of the
defendant.181 These types of postings could be easily removed by other tenants; this had, in fact, occurred on prior occasions at this building. 182 The
concern that the defendant would never be made aware of the proceeding
because the notice would not come to his attention and the fact that other
more reliable means of service were available to the plaintiff rendered this
method of notice unconstitutional.183
In Dusenbery v. United States,184 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent revealed
that she was concerned with the majority’s endorsement of service on a
prisoner via mail as constitutional when the prisoner did not sign for the
mail.185 While the statutorily approved method of service did not require
such a signature, it was the practice of the prison to require prisoner signatures when mail was delivered to a prisoner.186 Justice Ginsburg raised the
concern that the defendant would not be made aware of the service; however, while the majority did not share her concern, it did recognize that awareness of the notice itself is an essential aspect of notice.187
Beyond making the defendant aware of the proceeding, notice must be
able to prompt the defendant to seize his opportunity to be heard in court.188
This aspect of apprising a defendant of his rights or “attract[ing] [his] attention to the proceeding”189 is essential as it motivates him to look deeper into
the claims against him and maybe even consult with a lawyer. As service of
process methods are evolving, this is becoming more of a concern. However, this aspect of notice has always been an underlying theme in the constitutional analysis of notice and is even present in the unwavering endorsement
of in-hand personal service of process as a “gold standard” method of notice.

181. Id. at 453–54. (The Court explained, “As the process servers were well aware, notices posted on apartment doors in the area where these tenants lived were ‘not infrequently’
removed by children or other tenants before they could have their intended effect. Under
these conditions, notice by posting on the apartment door cannot be considered a ‘reliable
means of acquainting interested parties of the fact that their rights are before the courts.’”).
Id.
182. Id. at 453.
183. Id. at. 453–456.
184. 534 U.S. 161 (2002).
185. Id. at 173 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 171–72.
187. Id. at 168 (noting that the issue was whether “the notice in this case ‘reasonably
calculated under all the circumstances’ to apprise petitioner of the pendency of the cash forfeiture”).
188. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 316 (1950) (discussing the
challenge with notice via publication is this case was its inability to “attract the parties’ attention to the proceeding” and failure to “reasonably be expected to convey a warning”).
189. Id.
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One way we can ensure notice will provide this prompting is by ensuring the process is sufficiently formal. Formality in legal proceedings serves
an important purpose; it sets the moment apart from other mundane activities, defining the very event as significant. In-hand personal service of process carries with it many formal attributes that serve to set it apart as important.190 In many states, the process server is a designated official (such as
a sheriff or marshal).191 Even receiving a hand-delivered document is a more
formal way to obtain information than everyday communication.192
Beyond the formality associated with it, in-hand service of process is
sufficiently conspicuous simply because of its traditional role in the U.S.
legal system.193 Like its procedural due process counterpart, personal jurisdiction, traditional forms of notice are arguably constitutionally sufficient
because of their widespread adoption at the time of Mullane.194 The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of asserting personal jurisdiction by way of serving a non-resident defendant while he was in the forum, a
process known as tag or transient jurisdiction, in Burnham v. Superior Court
of California, City of Marin.195 While the Court unanimously agreed that the
assertion of personal jurisdiction was constitutional, the justices disagreed as
to why tag personal jurisdiction was proper. Justice Scalia, writing for a
plurality, argued that tag jurisdiction was a constitutionally acceptable way
of asserting personal jurisdiction over the defendant because it had been
traditionally regarded as such.196 Justice Scalia explained that the only consideration for the Court should be the historical pedigree of the method.197
Justice Brennan, in a separate opinion, disagreed that history alone could
serve as the litmus test for whether tag jurisdiction was constitutional.198
However, in applying the International Shoe test to tag jurisdiction, Justice
Brennan explained that the act of getting tagged in the forum created an
expectation in the defendant that he would be hailed into the forum for the
claim that was the basis of the suit for which he was tagged.199 This expectation arose, in part, because of the accepted practice of tag jurisdiction and its
accepted meaning.
190. Hedges, supra note 35, at 73 (discussing the importance of the ritual function of inhand service of process).
191. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text (discussing who may serve notice).
192. Hedges, supra note 35, at 73.
193. Id.
194. See WRIGHT, supra note 20 (discussing the connection between notice and personal
jurisdiction).
195. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
196. Id. at 629 (Brennan, J., concurring).
197. Id. at 621 (plurality opinion) (explaining that “for our purposes, its validation is its
pedigree, as the phrase ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’ makes clear.”).
198. Id. at 629 (Brennan, J., concurring).
199. Id. at 635–38.
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While the tests for procedural due process in the context of personal jurisdiction and notice have evolved along different paths following the modern tests of International Shoe and Mullane, the constitutional analysis in
the context of personal jurisdiction has significant points of overlap with
notice. Namely, the Court’s reliance on the perceived expectations from the
practice of being served suggests that the shared understanding of its legal
significance contributes to its acceptance as constitutional. Viewing in-hand
service through the lens of Burnham, one can appreciate why in-hand service of process has consistently been supported as a constitutionally sufficient form of notice. By the very fact of it being built into the fabric of our
litigation process, through a common understanding of its meaning200 developed by its historic use, in-hand service of process is a sufficiently proper
way to “apprise” a defendant of his opportunity to be heard. Personal service
is highly conspicuous—the act itself is notable and imbued with enough
meaning201 that it will spur the defendant to seize his opportunity to be heard
on the matter.
Methods less formal and less engrained in our cultural understanding
must achieve conspicuousness in another way. One example of a method for
service of process that has garnered widespread support is service via mail.
While there are multiple variations on how states permit service via mail, a
common requirement is for the mail to be sent via certified202 or registered
mail.203 This type of mailing requires a signature upon delivery and ensures
that undeliverable mail will be returned to the sender. By requiring a signature, the state is accomplishing two goals—ensuring the defendant actually
receives the mail and increasing the likelihood that the defendant will be
signaled to the importance of the contents of the mail.204
Few states permit service of process via ordinary mail absent some additional considerations. For example, for those states that do permit service
via mail, they require the plaintiff to couple service via ordinary mail with
another method of service.205 The additional limitations present on the use of
service via ordinary mail reflect the concerns with its conspicuousness. The
requirement of a back-up service method increases the likelihood that the
defendant will take note of the notice he receives. Alternatively, if other
200. Hedges, supra note 35, at 73.
201. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text (discussing the cultural significance
of in-hand service of process).
202. 62B AM. JUR. 2D Process § 195 (2016) (explaining the restrictions on certified mail).
203. 58 AM. JUR. 2D Notice § 29 (2016).
204. Arguably, even if a signature were not required, the receipt of certified or registered
mail is considered to be sufficiently conspicuous to apprise the defendant of the importance
of the contents of the mail.
205. See, e.g., CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 415.20 (West 2016) (permitting service via mail
when service is also made at the defendant’s office).
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methods are not available, the service by ordinary mail becomes acceptable
as a method that is “not substantially less likely to bring home notice” than
other available methods.206
Many states permit service of process via service on a defendant’s
dwelling. This typically occurs when the plaintiff serves a statutorily approved person who resides at the defendant’s dwelling. 207 Again, present in
this recognized method of service is an appreciation of the conspicuousness
of the service. By serving the defendant at his dwelling, we accept that the
plaintiff has brought the notice home to the defendant—to the place where
we expect him to be found, and he expects to receive important information.208 The limitation on who can receive the service at the dwelling is
similarly linked to conspicuousness and awareness. Most states, and the
FRCP, require the individual to be a resident of the dwelling.209 This ensures
that the person also views the dwelling as a home and takes heed of important notice delivered to the dwelling. Moreover, the person served must
be of a suitable age and discretion to appreciate the importance of the notice
and the need to provide it to the defendant.210 Some states set specific age
limits while others have a more flexible consideration of suitability.211 Under
either approach, the rules establish these precautions to ensure the notice
will be brought to the attention of the defendant.
As courts have considered less traditional methods of service, the desire to ensure that the method of service will be sufficiently conspicuous so
as to “attract the parties’ attention to the proceeding” 212 predominates the
notice analysis. For example, one common thread of analysis is the desire to
identify whether the defendant has used the proposed method for service as
a mode of communication in other important matters.213 Arguably, by relying on a method of communication that the defendant himself had used to
conduct his business (and other important affairs) the court ensures that the
defendant would be likely to see the notice and that he would be sufficiently

206. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
207. See supra Section II.B.1.b.
208. This is in part, because the definition of “dwelling” or “abode” denotes a place of
permanence akin to one’s home. Id.; 62B AM. JUR. 2D Process § 178 (2016) (noting that
while there is some disagreement of how to define “dwelling” or “abode” there is consensus
that “the person [must be] living [there] at the particular time” of service).
209. 62B AM. JUR. 2D Process § 191(2016).
210. See supra Section II.B.1.b.
211. 62B AM. JUR. 2D Process § 192 (2016).
212. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 316 (1950).
213. For example, in Rio Properties v. Rio Intern. Interlink, the court permitted service
via email after noting, among other considerations, that the defendant had repeatedly used
email to communicate with the plaintiff in relation to matters that formed the basis of the suit.
284 F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002).
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apprised of his need to respond to information received this way.214 After all,
if the defendant is in the habit of responding and acting on information received by a certain method, he will do the same with notice sent by this
route.
In many of the above methods of service of process—service via inhand, mail, dwelling and email—the importance of the conspicuousness of
the notice is implicit in the endorsement of the method or in the limitations
added to the method. In the context of service via publication or posting,
conspicuousness of the notice is often explicitly addressed in the service
rules or by the court when ordering the notice.215 The concern over conspicuousness only highlights the importance of this principle of notice, despite
its often implicit assumption into constitutional analysis.
3.

The Delivery of Service Must Be Verifiable

The next key principle underlying the constitutional jurisprudence of
notice is the need to ensure that the method of service can be independently
verified. This is an important aspect of notice and is necessary to preserve
the defendant’s opportunity to be heard.216 To ensure the integrity of its process, the court must be able to ensure that the service of process was actually
made.217 This cannot be done unless there is an independent way to verify
the act of service of process through independent and authenticated evidence.218 Additionally, in most jurisdictions, a defendant has a sufficient
opportunity to challenge faulty service of process.219
Proof of service of process can be accomplished in a variety of ways.
When the server is not an official (such as a sheriff or marshal), most jurisdictions require the individual who performed service file an affidavit with
the court describing how and when service was accomplished.220 The defendant can challenge the affidavit and have an evidentiary hearing in
214. Id. (noting that “[i]f any method of communication is reasonably calculated to provide [the defendant] with notice” it is “the method of communication which [the defendant]
utilizes and prefers”).
215. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 5:70–2.11(a)(4)(ii) (2016) (requiring posted notice to be posted
in a “conspicuous” manner).
216. Koster v. Sullivan, 160 So.3d 385, 388, (Fla. 2015) (holding that “the return of service is the instrument a court relies on to determine whether jurisdiction over an individual
has been established”).
217. Id.; 62B AM. JUR. 2D Process § 260 (2016).
218. Id. at § 262 (2016).
219. Id. at § 274 (2016) (discussing the process by which a defendant challenges the
sufficiency of service; but see id. at § 270 (2016) (discussing the presumption of sufficiency
given to service by a state official, and removing it from challenge by extrinsic evidence).
220. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(l)(1) Jurisdictions also permit a plaintiff to present evidence in
addition to the server’s affidavit if service is challenged by the defendant. Crabtree v. City of
Durham, 526 S.E.2d 503, 505 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
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court.221 This aspect of service of process legitimizes the methods used, and
it allows the court to remain impartial and rule on any alleged service deficiencies by relying on evidence of service.222
Verification of service of process also provides certainty that the notice
requirements have been met. For example, many states have sample form
affidavits that describe the components of service.223 These forms create
uniformity and minimize the chance that service will be performed in error.
Intentionally insufficient service (or “sewer service”) is also curbed by the
requirement that the person performing service must swear to the service in
the affidavit.224
In addition to requiring service to be supported by some proof (such as
an affidavit), the service rules also ensure service can be verified by limiting
who can perform service. Many jurisdictions require service to be performed
by a sheriff, marshal, or other approved official. Other jurisdictions permit a
broader group of individuals to perform service, including anyone over the
age of eighteen.225 The only limit placed on the person performing service is
that he or she must not be a party to the suit. This requirement serves to ensure that the individual performing service will be independent from the
lawsuit, increasing the ease to question this individual in court on a matter
that should be separate from the merits of the underlying lawsuit.226
When service is performed via mail, the preference for registered or
certified mail also demonstrates a preference for service that can be offered
along with the server’s affidavit as proof of service.227 For ordinary mail,
most states require the sender to submit an affidavit demonstrating where
and when the mail was sent and acknowledge that the mail had not been
returned as undelivered.228
221. Se. Termite & Pest v. Ones, 792 So.2d 1266, 1268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (reasoning “where the contents of an affidavit supporting a defendant’s contention of insufficiency of service would, if true, invalidate the purported service and nullify the court’s personal
jurisdiction over the defendant, the trial court should hold an evidentiary hearing before deciding the issue”).
222. 62B AM. JUR. 2D Process § 208 (2016).
223. For an example of a forum that permits the server to affirm to service via social
media. See Serving Papers, UTAH COURTS, https://www.utcourts.gov/howto/service/service_
of_process.html (last visited June 23, 2016).
224. Some jurisdictions permit the party injured by a false affidavit to bring a claim
against the affiant. State ex rel. Seals v. McGuire, 608 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Mo. 1980).
225. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c).
226. Credibility is not in question and you do not have to make a party testify and raise a
challenge to his credibility.
227. In re Cox, 244 S.E.2d 733, 735 (N.C. App. 1978).
228. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 417.10(e) (West 2016) (when service is permitted, in
part, by ordinary mail, the server is required to submit “an affidavit showing the time and
place copies of the summons and of the complaint were mailed to the party to be served, if in
fact mailed”).
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Notice Must Provide Sufficient Access to the Summons and Complaint

As notice jurisprudence has evolved, the requirement that the method
of service provide sufficient access to the summons and complaint has not
been a focal point. Primarily this is because, until recent years, service of
process was almost always reduced to hard copy form. As long as the service of process provided the requisite components, it would sufficiently provide access to the materials necessary to achieve constitutional notice.229 In
Mullane, the Court distinguished the components of notice; treating challenges to manner of service separately from challenges to the content of
service.230 While these remain separate components, the method of service
places potential encumbrances on the ability to access the content of service.
When considering the appropriateness of the service method, the method
should provide the contents of notice in a format that is both readable and
facilitates the defendant’s ability to secure legal counsel.231 The challenges
to readability are associated closely with the other concern regarding the
format of notice—whether the format will facilitate assistance by legal
counsel. At its core, the service of process can preserve the defendant’s opportunity to be heard only to the extent it allows him to present a defense to
the claims brought against him. In order to seize his opportunity to be heard,
the defendant will need to be able to provide the summons and complaint to
his lawyer.
IV. EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL MEDIA ON THE PRINCIPLES OF
NOTICE
After examining the accepted principles underlying the constitutional
jurisprudence of notice, this section turns to a discussion of how changes in
technology pose challenges to, along with new opportunities for, providing
notice to defendants. Each underlying principle is discussed in light of the
operation of social media in turn. Finally, this section examines some pragmatic considerations that support the use of social media as a service of process method.

229. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). Often the
required materials include the summons and complaint. FED. R. CIV. P. 4.
230. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
231. See Schreck, supra note 147, at 1140 (discussing the challenges with electronic
discovery, including the limits on sending and receiving files); Tamayo, supra note 147, at
229 (discussing the limits in transferring files).
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Technology has radically altered the way in which we communicate
and receive important information.232 At the time of Mullane, the only methods for transmitting service of process consisted of in-hand service of process, mail, publication in a printed newspaper, and posting on physical
structures. The advance of communication through electronic methods created entirely new ways to communicate with others, and significantly altered
some of these traditional methods. For example, when information became
digital we could track its transmission. There are now ways to verify messages are delivered by an independent electronic receipt. 233 Additionally, we
can verify the identity of the online users.234 Finally, with the advent of mobile devices and their widespread use in our culture, we can more easily
direct communications to an individual.235 This section addresses each of the
principles previously identified and analyzes how these norms would be
applied to service through social media.
To date, most courts have addressed newly proposed methods for
achieving notice by focusing on the specific technology being used, while
neglecting to look at these overarching principles.236 At a minimum, there
232. See supra notes 1–11 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of technology
on communication). A 2014 study conducted by the Pew Research Center found that
[r]oughly two-thirds (64%) of U.S. adults use Facebook, and half of those users
get news there—amounting to 30% of the general population. YouTube is the
next biggest social news pathway—about half of Americans use the site, and a
fifth of them get news there, which translates to 10% of the adult population and
puts the site on par with Twitter. Twitter reaches 16% of Americans and half of
those users say they get news there, or 8% of Americans. And although only 3%
of the U.S. population use reddit, for those that do, getting news there is a major
draw–62% have gotten news from the site.
Monica Anderson, et al., How Social Media is Shaping News, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 24,
2014),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/09/24/how-social-media-is-reshapingnews/.
233. See Adam Zuckerman, How to: Use google docs to Stealth Read Receipt, SOCIAL
MEDIA TODAY (May 11, 2011) http://www.socialmediatoday.com/content/how-use-googledocs-stealth-read-receipt (discussing how to encode a read receipt into any file to track when
it is read); Hannah Jane Parkinson, Message Read. But what kind of weirdo keeps read receipts on?, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 17, 2015) https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015
/aug/17/message-read-but-what-kind-of-weirdo-keeps-read-receipts-on (discussing the various ways social media captures automated “read receipts” and how to disable these features).
234. See Tilo Kmieckowiak, How to Verify Your Social Media Accounts, SOCIAL MEDIA
ANALYTICS BLOG (March 1, 2016) https://www.quintly.com/blog/2013/08/how-to-verifyyour-social-media-profiles/ (discussing how to verify a social media account to prevent others from using your persona).
235. See Anderson, supra note 10 (discussing use of mobile devices in the U.S. today);
see also Caddie Thompson, Social media apps are tracking your location in shocking detail,
BUSINESS INSIDER: TECH, (May 28, 2015) http://www.businessinsider.com/three-ways-socialmedia-is-tracking-you-2015-5 (discussing how various social media apps on mobile devices
utilize GPS location information).
236. See supra Section II.B.2 (discussing the evolution of electronic service of process).
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has been inconsistent application of prior constitutional theories in the context of new technology. As a result, courts and legislators have utilized an
unnecessarily constrained approach when considering new methods for
achieving notice.237 This limits the ability of our legal system to better reflect the way in which people become apprised of important information.
Consequently, by limiting notice to more traditional modes of communication, we may be eliminating possible methods for service that are more likely to reach certain defendants while professing to protect the right to know
of one’s opportunity to be heard in court. Conversely, simply because a new
social media platform has grown in popularity, does not mean that it will
provide constitutionally sufficient notice for all defendants. The operation
and typical use of social media platforms must be analyzed to ensure that
they would provide constitutional notice. This section seeks to expand the
dialogue surrounding new technologies by closely analyzing communication
through social media and highlighting areas where the operation of social
media creates tension with the principles of Mullane.
A.

How Social Media Impacts the Ability to Direct Notice to the Defendant

One key principle underlying notice is that it must be directed to the
correct defendant. As previously discussed, this has two aspects: that the
notice must be provided to the correct defendant and be sufficiently directed
at him as an individual.238
1.

Is the Notice Directed at the Correct Defendant?

Social media creates challenges and provides new opportunities to ensure that service of process reaches the correct defendant. The first challenge
is the possibility the account being served is a fictitious or fraudulent account.239 To create an individual account, most social media platforms require a person to provide an email and some basic identifying information.240 The account holder typically has to agree to the user policy,
237. Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, No. 11 CIV. 6608 JFK, 2012 WL 2086950, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012) (noting that the request to permit service via Facebook was “unorthodox”).
238. See supra Section III.B.1.
239. Fortunato, 2012 WL 2086950, at *2 (rejecting Facebook as a method for service, in
part, because of the possibility that “anyone can make a Facebook profile using real, fake, or
incomplete information”).
240. Signing up with Twitter, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/100990 (last
visited June 23, 2016); How do I sign up for Facebook?, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/help/188157731232424 (last visited June 23, 2016); Getting
Started, SNAPCHAT, https://support.snapchat.com/en-US/about/getting-started (last visited
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which typically forbids the creation of an account for an improper purpose.241 However, because there is no method to ensure that the person creating the account is, in fact, who he says he is, using the account to achieve
service of process creates a risk that the notice will not be provided to the
actual defendant.
While this might be seen as a troubling phenomenon, further investigation into fraudulent accounts minimizes the concern. Facebook, the most
popular social media platform, reports that anywhere from 5.5% to 11.2% of
Facebook profiles are “fake.”242 However, many accounts are labeled “fake”
by Facebook because they do not comply with the Facebook account
rules.243 For example, an account is considered fake if the creator misclassifies the account.244 Such accounts are typically created for things like a family pet—while obviously running afoul of the Facebook rules, these types of
accounts would not create the kind of concern envisioned by courts that
have rejected the prospect of serving a defendant via social media.245
Accounts created to mirror those of actual adults are more troubling. 246
These accounts are particularly troublesome because of the anonymity afforded to the account holder—the fraudulent creator can operate behind the
web, at a keyboard. Fraudulent accounts are often created by using photos
and information from a real account, though they often are hosted on
webpages with odd links containing misspellings to avoid Facebook security.247
Fraudulent accounts created as a mirror of a real person are typically
created to either phish for information from the real account holder’s connections on the social media platform248 or are created to fraudulently influJune
23,
2016);
Creating
an
Account
&
Username,
INSTAGRAM,
https://help.instagram.com/182492381886913/ (last visited June 23, 2016); Signing Up to
Join LinkedIn, LINKEDIN, https://help.linkedin.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/2964/~/signingup-to-join-linkedin (last visited June 23, 2016).
241. See Facebook User Agreement, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms (last
visited June 23, 2016).
242. Emil Protalinski, Facebook estimates between 5.5% and 11.2% of accounts are fake,
THE NEXT WEB (Feb. 3, 2013) http://thenextweb.com/facebook/2014/02/03/facebookestimates-5-5-11-2-accounts-fake/#gref.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. Approximately, 0.8 percent to 2.1 percent of the “fraudulent” accounts fit this
category. Id.
246. See Id. Of the remaining “fraudulent” accounts, only 4.3 percent to 7.9 percent of
accounts were duplicates of an individual account, and not all of these were created with an
intent to create a “fraudulent” account. Id.
247. Beware of Socially Engineered Phishing Attacks on Facebook, FACECROOKS (Aug.
1, 2012) http://facecrooks.com/Scam-Watch/beware-of-socially-engineered-phishing-attackson-facebook.html/
248. Id.
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ence the way social media analytics work.249 For example, interested parties
who want to artificially enhance how information or news trends on some
social media platforms will use numerous fictitious accounts to react to the
social media page, driving the analytical tool.250 On Facebook, fake accounts
have affected the popularity of Facebook pages by generating enormous
numbers of fake “likes” on those pages.251 Fraudulent accounts, whether
created to phish for information or generate false analytics, generally do not
operate similar to real accounts.252 Therefore, while the existence of fraudulent social media accounts should be considered when carefully crafting a
service rule, the mere presence of some fictitious accounts should not operate as a prohibitive bar on the use of the social media platform as a method
of service.
Even when one considers service of process via in-hand service, there
is always the possibility that the person served is the not the actual defendant. Most service providers, who lack first-hand knowledge of the defendant’s identity, find ways to ensure that the person being served is the named
defendant.253 However, the named defendant might not be the one who actually accepts service. The challenge in a system embracing service via social
media is that the traditional approaches used by servers performing in-hand
service of process to verify the identity of person accepting service are not
applicable. For example, a process server may call out the name of the defendant when providing in-hand service to see if he responds—obviously
this is not possible on a social media platform.254
Additionally, we have endorsed service provided to a co-resident at the
defendant’s dwelling. This form of service provides alternative assurances
that the correct defendant will be served. First, the service must be provided
to the defendant’s known permanent dwelling.255 Even when we identify the
correct dwelling, we do not require service on the defendant himself because
we accept that the forum is sufficiently identified with the defendant and the

249. Jennifer Abel, Like-Farming Facebook Scams: Look Before You Like, CONSUMER
AFFAIRS (April 22, 2015) https://www.consumeraffairs.com/news/like-farming-facebookscams-look-before-you-like-042215.html.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.; Beware of Socially Engineered Phishing Attacks on Facebook, FACECROOKS
(Aug. 1, 2012) http://facecrooks.com/Scam-Watch/beware-of-socially-engineered-phishingattacks-on-facebook.html/
253. How to Identify Someone Who May Be Evading Service, SERVER-NOW (March 9,
2011) http://www.serve-now.com/articles/18/evading-process-server.
254. Id. It would be hard to catch the online fake account holder “off guard” with a posting, like yelling to someone in a public place.
255. See supra Sections II.B.1.b, III.B.
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person provided with service will be inclined to provide the service to the
defendant.256
Verification of the defendant through a social media platform could be
analogized to ensuring the defendant receive service via service on his
dwelling. In the context of social media, for defendants with regular substantial use of a social media account,257 the account is more like the defendant’s virtual “dwelling.” The platform, like the resident in a physical dwelling, operates as a reliable agent forwarding the information received in the
account to the defendant.
Through analogy to service via a defendant’s physical dwelling, the
service rules can be modified to ensure that service provided via social media reaches the named defendant. The account should have the hallmarks of
a “dwelling.” It should contain information known to be associated with the
defendant, such as a known email address and personal identifying information, along with photos of the defendant.258 To ensure the account is valid, the account can be examined for recognizable patterns of behavior.259
Moreover, the social media account should be a place where the defendant
“dwells” or can be regularly found by those who know him. The defendant
should make regular and consistent use of the account, regularly receiving
information there.260 If these attributes are present, notice directed to the
defendant’s social media account would be directed at the correct defendant.
2.

Is the Notice Directed at the Defendant in his Individual Capacity?

More generalized methods of communication—like publication—are
generally reserved for the less-favored back-up approach to service of pro256. See supra Sections II.B.1.b, III.B.
257. See infra Section V (discussing the type of user that could be considered to have a
virtual “dwelling”).
258. See Tabibi, supra note 141, at 56–7 (noting that “[A] party seeking to assure a court
that a social media account belongs to a hard-to-find defendant may potentially have a treasure trove of facts and information to present to a court to help authenticate an account” including “photos, videos, relationship status, birthday, hometown, current city, education,
work, languages spoken, and websites”).
259. By looking at patterns of behavior known to be associated with the defendant (such
as prior communications on social media with the parties to the lawsuit) or connections between the defendant’s account and other users known to associate with the defendant, the
account can be verified. Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 714 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015)
(using defendant’s prior communications as a basis for verifying the account); F.T.Comm’n.
v. PCCare247 Inc., No. 12 CIV. 7189 (PAE), 2013 WL 841037, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7,
2013) (using known connections on defendant’s Facebook account as a basis for verifying the
account).
260. See infra Section IV.B. (analyzing the level and nature of activity on a social media
account that would support providing notice via social media).

596

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

cess. In other words, only when the notice cannot be directed to the individual through more traditional methods, will the court consider these constructive forms of service. This bears on the use of social media as a method to
perform service of process because most platforms have aspects that provide
more individualized methods of communication and other aspects that provide more generalized information sharing.
The first way in which social media platforms differ from more traditional ways of receiving information is that most social media platforms
have two pathways for receiving information—individualized paths that
allow for the transmission to and from a very limited group of people and
more generalized pathways that allow for the transmission of information
between the account holder and large groups of people. Individualized
pathways can include private messaging offered on a variety of social media
applications.261 Generalized pathways can include posting on a Facebook
page or a Tweet linked to an individual’s Twitter handle.262
In examining the more generalized pathways of transmitting information via social media, it might be tempting to analogize the transmission
of information to that of publication.263 However, this is not an apt analogy.
Providing information to a defendant via publication has always been regarded as an ineffective means of service because of how unlikely it would
be that the defendant would actually see the notice.264 After all, how likely is
it that information posted in a generally circulating paper would come to the
attention of any particular defendant? However, generalized social media
posts are more directed. In fact, the unique ability to tag, link, or post in a
261. For example, under the current operation of Twitter, a user can send a direct message to anyone regardless of whether the user sending the message follows the other user or
not. However, if the recipient of the message does not follow the sender, the recipient will
only receive the message if they have selected the “Receive Direct Messages From Anyone”
in their “Security and Privacy” settings. About Direct Messages, TWITTER HELP CTR.,
https://support.twitter.com/articles/14606?lang=en (last visited June 24, 2016). Similarly, the
current operation of Facebook includes direct messaging. By default, any Facebook account
holder can send any other Facebook account holder a message. The message may be filtered
into a separate file until the recipient accepts the message. Sending a Message, FACEBOOK
HELP CTR., https://www.facebook.com/help/326534794098501/ (last visited June 24, 2016).
Other social media platforms have various direct messaging capabilities, including LinkedIn,
SnapChat, and Instagram.
262. How do I post on a Page that I visit? FACEBOOK HELP CTR.,
https://www.facebook.com/help/424946150928896 (last visited June 24, 2016); Posting
Replies or Mentions, TWITTER HELP CTR., https://support.twitter.com/articles/20169871 (last
visited June 24, 2016).
263. See Wagner & Castillo, supra note 141, at 273 (drawing an analogy between Facebook wall posts and publication in a newspaper and ultimately finding Facebook to be a more
reliable method of conveying notice than publication).
264. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950) (criticizing
notice through publication); see Eisenberg, supra note 54 (criticizing notice through publication).
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way that associates the message with the intended recipient, is one of the
advantages afforded by social media.265 It is this capability that has made
these tools such powerful vehicles of spreading messages.266 This aspect of
social media makes it more likely for messages sent through generalized
pathways to reach the intended audience than through traditional publication.
However, the more generalized pathways for communication via social
media—like postings on a Facebook wall or a Tweet—are not as directed as
traditional methods of service like in-hand service of process or service via
one’s dwelling. While the defendant may instantly see a message posted
through a generalized tool on social media (if, for example, he sees it on his
mobile device after being instantly notified of the communication),267 the
content might not be sufficiently directed at the individual defendant so as to
bring home notice. Generalized messages may link the content to the intended recipient, but may also link the same message to many people.268
This diffuse aspect of social media poses possible challenges to its use as a
vehicle for service of process.
The high volume of messaging and the impact this volume has on how
one receives information only adds to the diffuse nature of social media
platforms.269 As discussed above, the social media platform might be most
likened to one’s dwelling because it is tailored to the individualized account
holder and is a place where he consistently returns to or can be found.270
265. See Social Networking Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 27, 2013),
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/social-networking-fact-sheet/ (summarizing research
on the social impact of social media).
266. See id. (summarizing research on how individuals use social media to interact with
others); Lee Rainie, Social Media and Voting, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 6, 2012),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2012/11/06/social-media-and-voting/ (examining the impact of
social media on voting behavior in the 2012 presidential election).
267. See Maeve Duggan, Mobile Messaging and Social Media 2015, PEW RES. CTR.
(Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/08/19/mobile-messaging-and-socialmedia-2015/ (examining the growing use of mobile apps to engage with social media).
268. For example, the use of a hashtag can connect a message to a trending topic. Assuming a privacy setting was not used, all those following the hashtag can view the message. See
Using Hashtags on Twitter, Twitter, https://support.twitter.com/articles/49309 (last visited
Oct. 19, 2016); How Do I Use Hashtags?, FACEBOOK HELP CTR., https://www.facebook.com
/help/587836257914341?helpref=faq_content (last visited Oct. 19, 2016); Who Can See My
Posts When I Use Hashtags?, FACEBOOK HELP CTR., https://www.facebook.com/help/134343
280099148?helpref=faq_content (last visited Oct. 19, 2016).
269. It is estimated that every 60 seconds there are 243,000 photos shared, 50,000 links
shared, and 3 million likes on Facebook. Just One Minute on Facebook, WE ARE SOC. MEDIA
(June 11, 2014), http://wersm.com/just-one-minute-on-facebook-infographic/; see also Social
Networking Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 27, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/factsheets/social-networking-fact-sheet/ (reviewing the way “power users” engage with social
media).
270. See supra Section II.B.1.b (discussing the service on physical dwellings).

598

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

However, unlike providing information to a person by serving an approved
resident at his dwelling, providing information to a defendant via his social
media platform does not assure transmission of the service in that same way;
it is less certain the served “resident” will provide the service to the defendant. For example, when a plaintiff provides service at the defendant’s physical dwelling by serving someone who resides at the dwelling, there is generally some assurance that the service will reach the defendant because there
are, presumably, a limited number of people who reside at the dwelling and
a limited source of information flowing to the defendant in this manner.
When the resident is served, he is alerted to the importance of the information and we are comfortable that he will pass the notice on to the defendant.
A “virtual” dwelling on social media, however, differs in key ways
from a defendant’s physical dwelling. First, there are multiple “residents” at
the dwelling. For example, there are generally several possible pathways for
generalized communications, from direct postings on a person’s account,271
to a variety of ways to link someone to a message or image. 272 The more
“residents” at the home, the more concern that the defendant will miss the
communication. Even more problematic is the amount of messages coming
through these “residents.” There might be unlimited numbers of social media users who can create posts or send generalized messages that are associated with the account holder. To handle the volume of information, most
social media pages employ sophisticated analytics to judge the significance
of more generalized posts on the account.273 While there is a perception that
service made on a resident at the defendant’s physical dwelling will find its
way to the hands of the defendant, the flow of information on social media
is more difficult to predict.
By contrast, the individualized communication pathways present on
social media provide a highly directed form of communication. In these
routes, the message is sent directly to the account holder.274 Oftentimes,
these messages are not filtered by the social media platform, which creates a
highly individualized and direct path of communication. However, social
media platforms have employed filters that limit this type of access to the

271. An example of this communication include posting on another person’s Facebook
wall.
272. Examples of this communication include linking or tagging another person’s social
media account in an image or post shared on any social media platform.
273. For example, Facebook controls the messages that are displayed in the account holder’s “news feed.” How does News Feed decide which stories to show?, FACEBOOK: HELP
CTR., https://www.facebook.com/help/166738576721085 (last visited June 24, 2016).
274. See generally Protalinski, supra note 242.
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account holder (even without the knowledge of the account holder).275
Therefore, while most social media platforms provide a highly individualized and direct path of communication to an account holder, the actual operation of the platform should be considered before carte blanc acceptance of
it as a method for service of process.
For these reasons, courts and legislators should endeavor to look at the
distinguishing features of social media platforms—how they offer unique
forms of communication different from traditionally accepted methods for
service of process—and consider their operation in connection with the goal
of providing notice. First, service rules and orders providing for service of
process via social media should have as a key component some mechanism
to verify the identity of the defendant as the social media account holder.276
Second, there should be some assurance that the message is delivered
through a sufficiently individualized path and no known blocks have been
added to prevent delivery of service.277
B.

How Social Media Impacts the Conspicuousness of Notice

Despite initial resistance, the legal system has begun to embrace the
use of electronically stored information and has permitted once formalized
events to occur through less-formal electronic means.278 Namely, the federal
courts279 and several state courts280 have moved to a system of e-filing for
court documents. Within these systems, courts have embraced the electronic
service of documents other than the complaint. In addition, discovery rules
have been amended to account for the storage and maintenance of relevant

275. How can I check if I have message requests on Facebook?, FACEBOOK HELP CTR.,
https:// www.facebook.com/help/936247526442073 (last visited June 24, 2016) (explaining
the filtering of messages).
276. See infra Part V (providing a legislative proposal for a default option for social media service of process); see also Eisenberg, supra note 54, at 805–06 (discussing using “pictures, personal information such as birth date and name, and even crosscheck lists of Facebook friends with the defendant’s known associates”); and Tabibi, supra note 141, at 56–57.
277. See infra Part V (providing a legislative proposal that mandates “conspicuous” postings and requires a confirmation of delivery).
278. See Roger Winters, Controversy and Compromise on the Way to Electronic Filing,
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS 125–127 (2005), http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/re
f/collection/tech/id/586.
279. Electronic Filing (CM/ECF), U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/courtrecords
/electronic-filing-cmecf (last visited June 24, 2016).
280. See Rob Tricchinelli, State courts continue move toward electronic filing, docketing,
REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (Summer 2013), http://www.rcfp.org/browsemedia-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2013/state-courtscontinue-move-.
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information in a purely electronic format.281 These changes have been
brought about for pragmatic reasons—namely, the ease and efficiency afforded by electronic distribution of information.282 However, electronic
communication would not be embraced in e-filing or in e-discovery if it
were perceived that the significance of these electronic communications
would escape those involved in the process.283 The fact that electronic communication has been embraced as a part of these legal processes lends support to extending recognition of service of process through newer electronic
means.284 Therefore, service methods that, as a practical matter, sufficiently
apprise the defendant of his need to seize his opportunity to be heard, should
be considered constitutional even though they lack traditional or formal indicia of conspicuousness.
There are some practical limitations on the conspicuousness of information shared through social media that must be addressed before it can be
embraced as a method for service of process. First, most social media platforms operate in a manner that may actually serve to bury the information
distributed through it.285 Some information may be immediately brought to
the attention of the user while other information may be relegated to a
placement on the platform (akin to a spam folder in an email system) that is
less likely to be noticed by the intended recipient.286 Even information
shared through more direct pathways (such as a private messaging) can be
filtered away from the account holder’s immediate view.287
Moreover, the account holder himself can establish filters to prevent
communication from certain individuals or from non-pre-approved individuals.288 Even beyond platform-imposed or account-user-selected filters, the
sheer volume of content shared on social media platforms limits the conspicuousness of any individual message. When notice could be communi281. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (defining the scope of discovery to account for the
challenges attendant to electronically stored information).
282. See Hedges, supra note 35, at 58–59, 73–74 (discussing the movement to e-filing in
federal court).
283. Id. at 56–57.
284. Id. at 73–74.
285. As discussed, posts on more generalized information sharing pathways (such as
posts or Tweets which can be generated and viewed by many people) are often filtered by the
platform itself. See How do I post on a Page that I visit? FACEBOOK HELP CTR.,
https://www.facebook.com/help/424946150928896 (last visited June 24, 2016).
286. Id. Even placement on the social media platform, such as at the bottom of a long list
of posts, may prevent it from being seen.
287. Many social media platforms filter even private messages when the account holder
does not have an established connection or pattern of communication with the sender.
288. For example, an account holder on Facebook can alter the settings on the account to
prevent filtering or to prevent other users getting access to the account. Basic Privacy Settings & Tools, FACEBOOK HELP CTR. https://www.facebook.com/help/325807937506242/
(last visited June 24, 2016).
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cated as part of a flurry of messages, the notice is not likely “to attract the
[recipient’s] attention to the proceeding.”289
Finally, electronic notice presents a unique challenge to conspicuousness; users may fail to open, or receive, notice transmitted on social media
out of a generalized fear of receiving electronic files from users unknown to
them.290 Even when messages containing files are not filtered out by the
account holder, the account holder may be leery in opening a message because of the popularly-held belief that messages from unknown senders are
likely to contain corrupted files.291 While there is always the fear that the
defendant might not accept service being provided him, the defendant might
have a legitimate reason to reject opening or accepting service sent via an
electronic method. For this reason, there must be a sufficient mechanism to
prevent the defendant from taking steps to evade service while providing for
alternative service options when there are concerns that the defendant may
not have received service due to a legitimate fear of opening a file.292
Despite these recognized impediments to conspicuousness inherent in
service of process via social media, there are some features of social media
that would make notice delivered through it more conspicuous than that
delivered through more traditional methods. Social media platforms are oftentimes accessed via mobile devices, meaning that the defendant could be
served anywhere.293 Additionally, most mobile devices have applications
that instantly notify the user when a social media posting or message has
been sent.294 Again, while users can alter their devices to prevent instant
notifications, the possibility of instant notification is typically not possible
when service is provided through mail, service on defendant’s dwelling, by
posting, or by publication.
Moreover, service via social media can be approved in such a manner
as to ensure that the notice will be sufficiently conspicuous so as to apprise
the defendant of his rights. For example, the service rules or order could
target users who have patterns of behavior suggesting they will likely receive notice in this manner.295 Users who have strong patterns of use of the
social media tool—through frequent and regular use of the tool in sending
and receiving information—are more likely to find notice sent via that tool.
289. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 316 (1950).
290. Schreck, supra note 147, at 1136–1138.
291. Id.
292. See infra Part V proposing a mechanism to provide alternate service when a defendant’s receipt of the service is not apparent from behavior or automated transmissions.
293. See Anderson, supra note 10 (discussing use of mobile devices in the U.S.).
294. See Facebook Mobile, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/mobile/ (last visited
October 20, 2016); Notifications on mobile devices, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/artic
les/20169887 (last visited October 20, 2016).
295. See infra Part V (proposing a defined user on whom social media service could be a
default option).
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Additionally, the service rule or order could require the confirmation of the
receipt of notice.296 This could be obtained through behavior of the recipient.
The commenting, forwarding, responding to, or even deletion of the message297 containing appropriately and conspicuously designated notice, could
serve as a method of verification that the notice was received and is sufficiently conspicuous. To the extent the social media tool provides an
acknowledgement that a message is read by the recipient, it would serve as a
means to ensure the notice is conspicuous. Alternatively, the service rule or
order could mandate the use of an additional traditional method of service of
process if, after a designated period of time, the content of the notice is not
acknowledged.
C.

How Social Media Impacts the Verifiability of Notice

One primary concern by those reluctant to embrace service through social media is the concern that the platforms are inherently unreliable.298
There is growing data that demonstrates the wide-spread use of these tools
as an important source of information for a growing number of people.299
One challenge is the lack of familiarity many judges and lawmakers have
with the functionality of these tools—300enhancing the skepticism of their
use in a key aspect of legal process. Additionally, the fast-paced evolution
of social media platforms out-paces the rate of changes in our law. Decisions or rules reliant on a particular feature of the social media quickly become irrelevant or unworkable.
296. See Knapp, supra note 141, at 578 (noting that service via Facebook is more reliable
than publication because receipt of notice can be verified through a read receipt).
297. See Hedges, supra note 35, at 74 (arguing that the “very act of deletion [of electronic
service of process] would validate the fact that the defendant was aware of being served”).
298. WhosHere, Inc. v. Orun, No. 1:13-CV-00526-AJT, 2014 WL 670817 at *4 (E.D. Va.
Feb. 20, 2014); F.T.Comm’n. v. PCCare247 Inc., No. 12 CIV. 7189 (PAE), 2013 WL
841037, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013).
299. One recent reported stated:
Roughly two-thirds (64%) of U.S. adults use Facebook, and half of those users
get news there—amounting to 30% of the general population. YouTube is the
next biggest social news pathway—about half of Americans use the site, and a
fifth of them get news there, which translates to 10% of the adult population and
puts the site on par with Twitter. Twitter reaches 16% of Americans and half of
those users say they get news there, or 8% of Americans. And although only 3%
of the U.S. population use reddit, for those that do, getting news there is a major
draw–62% have gotten news from the site.
Monica Anderson & Andrea Caumont, How Social Media is Reshaping News, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 24, 2014) http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/09/24/howsocial-media-is-reshaping-news/.
300. Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 711, fn.1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) (noting
that members of the New York State judiciary were not likely to be among the 157,000,000
people who check their Facebook accounts daily).
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When one looks past these initial reservations it is clear that the law
has never demanded a fool-proof method of service of process. The law has
acquiesced to methods like service by mail even when documents sent via
mail might be mislabeled, misdelivered, or even lost.301 Similarly, service to
dwellings might be misplaced by the resident served or not ultimately provided to the actual defendant. Service via social media, which in some instances may be more reliable than traditional methods of service, should not
be outright rejected because it cannot assure actual notice.302
Recognizing that service might be deficient has given rise to methods
that verify the act of service. These verifications also provide courts with an
independent source who can be examined in court under oath if service is
later challenged. While using social media as an approved method for service might not have widespread support in the legal community, there are
ways to modify our current verification processes to ensure proper service.
First, service by social media could be verified by affidavit in much the
same way as other forms of service of process are verified. The service rules
in Utah permit plaintiffs to move the court for service via publication or “by
some other means” when traditional methods of service become impracticable or when the defendant’s identity or whereabouts are unknown or when
he avoids service.303 While the rule does not specifically address what is
included in “other means,” the Utah courts have been permitting service via
Facebook and Twitter for the past six years.304 To verify that the service
occurred, the server must file an affidavit detailing the service, checking a
box as to which social media tool (Facebook or Twitter) was used, and listing the “name” of that account.305
A similar approach could be used to verify service through any social
media platform. To allay the concerns of those skeptical of service via social
media, the affidavit could require more information than that required by the
Utah form. For example, it could require the affiant to specify the method
used to communicate the notice (e.g., whether the server used a generalized
pathway of communication such as a wall post or a more individualized
301. Kevin W. Lewis, Comment, E-Service: Ensuring the Integrity of International EMail Service of Process, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 285, 302 (2008) (noting that traditional “means of service have their flaws. The United States Postal Service is vulnerable to
human error, resulting in lost mail and deliveries to wrong addresses. Notice by publication
also carries imperfections because it can be misprinted.”).
302. See Hedges, supra note 35 at 67–68 (reasoning that traditional methods of service
have “serious flaws” and yet are still considered proper methods for achieving notice; therefore, electronic service of process should not be held to higher standard).
303. UTAH R. CIV. P. 4(d)(4)(A).
304. See Irvine, supra note 61 (discussing the implementation of Utah’s alternative service of process rule).
305. Id.; Proof of Alternative Service Form, UTAH COURTS, http://www.utcourts.gov/how
to/service/docs/06_Proof_of_Alternative_Service.pdf (last visited June 25, 2016).
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pathway of communication such as a private message). Additionally, the
affiant could be required to specify how many times the service was distributed. The affiant could also be required to submit additional documentation
in support of his affidavit—including screen shots of the posting and any
screens that demonstrate the defendant received or opened the notice.306
These methods would serve to verify the delivery of service and diminish the concern that courts or legislators adopting these methods were endorsing categorically unreliable forms of service. Additionally, the court
would be provided with an independent verification of service that could be
tested in court should the service be challenged.
D.

How Social Media Impacts the Access to the Content of Notice

Because technology necessitates transmission of information in an
electronic medium, the notice must be sent electronically. Initially, concerns
expressed around service of process via email focused on whether the information sent could be downloaded and read by the recipient.307 With the
creation of portable document format (PDF) files, recipients can receive
information in a manner that does not require he use the same software,
hardware, or operating system as the sender. Most, but not all, social media
platforms permit the sharing of PDF files. Alternatively, JPEG files, which
can be used by capturing an image of the document, are also universally
readable. These types of files may be transmitted on most social media platforms.308
306. Examples could include dated screen shots of the defendant’s removal of the post, of
the defendant’s comment on the post, or of the read receipt notification automatically displayed by the social media platform. See Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 714
(N.Y.Sup. Ct. 2015) (relying on the plaintiff’s affidavit and attachment of screenshot of
communications on Facebook to order service via Facebook).
307. See Hedges, supra note 35, at 67 (discussing initial concerns raised by courts and
others when service via email was first being considered).
308. The present capacities of Facebook and LinkedIn permit users to transmit information via link or attachment of a wide variety of files, including PDF. How do I add an
attachment to my message? FACEBOOK: HELP CTR., https://www.facebook.com/help/121288
674619000 (last visited June 25, 2016); Attaching Files to Messages, LINKEDIN HELP, https://
help.linkedin.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/53703/~/attaching-files-to-messages (last visited
June 25, 2016). Other social media platforms, such as Twitter, SnapChat and Instagram currently permit transmission of information via JPEG file. How do I use Instagram direct?
INSTAGRAM HELP CTR., https://help.instagram.com/684926628219030 (last visited June 25,
2016); Posting photos or gifs on Twitter, TWITTER HELP CTR., https://help.instagram.com/684
926628219030 (last visited June 25, 2016); Share saved photos from your device, SNAPCHAT
SUPPORT, https://support.snapchat.com/en-US/a/photo-gallery (last visited June 25, 2016).
Presumably, if a defendant is a regular user of a social media platform, he is able to read and
exchange the types of files frequently found there. For example, a defendant would not make
regular and consistent use of social media platform that only permitted exchange of JPEG
files if he did not have the ability to download these files.
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To avoid any concern about the format of notice, service of process
could be more directly linked to the e-filing process already in use in many
state courts and in the federal courts.309 Documents are already served between parties participating in these e-filing regimes. Service of process
could simply convey information via PDF or JPEG, or it could include a
link to the court e-filing system with information to direct the defendant to
the case.
In addition to the file format, the notice must also be capable of being
provided to one’s legal counsel. One feature of some social media platforms
is to “emulate the best parts of face-to-face conversation” by not storing
information for very long after the recipient views the communication.310
Obviously, if information is programmed to disappear not long after being
viewed, this would pose a substantial impediment to the constitutionality of
the notice. A defendant must be able to easily deliver the contents of the
notice to his lawyer so that he can prepare his defense and seize his opportunity to be heard on the case. While recipients of electronic information can
always preserve the communication they receive by taking a screenshot of
the shared information, the onus should not be placed on the defendant to
realize the need to create such content.311 Rather, service rules and court
orders permitting service through social media should ensure that the method used does not have a default in which shared information is quickly
erased after being used.
E.

Pragmatic Considerations Supporting the Use of Social Media as a
Vehicle for Service of Process

The majority of this section has made the argument that service
through social media will provide notice that will meet the constitutional
standard set forth in Mullane by upholding the integral principles of due
process. Service of process via social media should also be embraced because it is a pragmatic solution that will ensure our legal system embraces
efficient and affordable legal processes.
First, the use of social media as a mechanism for service of process is
more efficient than more traditional methods of service. Unlike in-hand service of process, the defendant who regularly uses social media may not even
309. See Jennifer Lee Case, Note, Extra! Read All About It: Why Notice by Newspaper
Publication Fails to Meet Mullane’s Desire-to-Inform Standard and How Modern Technology Provides A Viable Alternative, 45 GA. L. REV. 1095, 1120-24 (2011) (recommending a
court database be created to promote electronic service of process).
310. Chat 2.0, SNAP CHAT, http://snapchat-blog.com/post/141902878020/chat-20 (last
visited June 25, 2016).
311. See Retrieve a copy of a snap, SNAPCHAT SUPPORT, https://support.snapchat.com/enUS/a/snap-content (last visited June 25, 2016) (discussing the limitations of SnapChat).
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need to be physically located.312 Many social media users receive updates to
their mobile devices from their social media platforms, making it more efficient to “locate” and serve the defendant. For those users who do not possess a mobile device or do not receive updates from their social media accounts on their mobile device, location of the defendant is still more efficient than through traditional service methods. A regular user of social media is likely to frequent the social media account and be “found” there.
Second, service via social media is also less expensive than traditional
methods of service.313 Service via in-hand personal service can be quite costly if the defendant is difficult to locate or if service must be attempted multiple times. Additionally, even service to a dwelling or service via mail, requires the expense of employing a courier. At present, social media accounts
are free to register for and dispatch with the need to have a paid courier service. While service via social media might necessitate multiple service attempts or require more by the server to ensure service is proper, these steps
do not necessarily come with additional expense.314 Service via social media
will likely save both the time and expense associated with delivery via process server or via mail courier.
Finally, social media should be approved as a mechanism for service
because it is a reliable way to receive and transmit information. What is particularly noteworthy is that social media is a much more reliable source for
information that pertains directly to the user. For example, an individual
may be more likely to turn to his social media account to receive important
updates about his personal network of friends or to retrieve messages directed to him than to any other source.
V. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS VIA
SOCIAL MEDIA
Having established that service of process via social media can meet
the standard for constitutionality set out in Mullane, this section sets forth
several legislative proposals designed to strike the delicate balance between
providing an efficient and cost-effective method for service of process with
the need to ensure adequate protection of the defendant’s constitutional
rights. First, this section provides guidance to legislatures by offering rule
language that creates an “automatic” avenue to service via social media, one
312. See Rio Properties v. Rio Intern. Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002)
(reasoning that electronic service of process permits service that is “aimed directly and instantly” at the defendant).
313. See Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 716 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) (discussing
the high costs associated with service via publication); Eisenberg, supra note 54, at 810-813.
314. If a private server is used, expenses might be associated with these additional steps;
arguably, this would still be less expensive than service through traditional methods.
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that permits service without prior court approval. Second, this section provides suggested rule language that creates intermediate legislative options,
through waiver of service provisions and service through court order, which
will serve to introduce social media as a method for service of process in a
uniform way. Lastly, this section will provide direction to courts considering
whether to grant a request to serve a defendant via social media under a current “catch all” service provision.
A.

A Legislative Proposal for an “Automatic” Pathway to Service via Social Media
1.

The Need for an “Automatic” Avenue

Service via social media should be included as an “automatic” avenue
to achieve notice because the principles underlying the constitutional requirement for notice can be achieved through service via social media. As
such, legislators should strive to provide a direct pathway to service via social media, free from any conditions or case-by-case court approval.315 By
limiting service via social media to a “back-up” option, for use only when
the traditional methods prove to be impracticable or impossible, or by requiring prior court approval to serve defendants via social media, some of
the inherent benefit of this service method is lost. Getting court approval
requires additional litigation, including the drafting, filing and possible hearing on a motion for alternative service, and its attendant costs. These expenses, both in terms of effort and finances, are not insignificant. However,
while there is a great need for efficient methods for service of process, these
pragmatic considerations must yield to procedural mechanisms that are necessary to ensure protection of the defendant’s constitutional rights. Consequently, any approved “automatic” avenue must be both efficient and easy
for the plaintiff to implement while providing adequate procedural safeguards to ensure protection of the defendant’s due process rights.
2.

Proposed Legislative “Automatic” Avenue to Service via Social
Media

The following proposed legislation integrates limitations on service via
social media to ensure that it will be “reasonably calculated to inform” the
defendant of the proceedings. As such, the proposed service rules in this
section provide for service via social media without the need for prior court
approval.
315. To date, no jurisdiction in the U.S. permits service of process via social media on
individuals without prior court approval.
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(a) Service via Social Media: An individual may be served by electronic
communication of the summons, in a readily accessible format, to the defendant’s qualifying social media account as defined in section (b). Service made to the defendant’s qualifying social media account will constitute valid service if the communication of the summons is made in a
conspicuous manner and service is confirmed under section (c). Service
is made in a conspicuous manner if it is likely to apprise a reasonable recipient of the pendency of the hearing.
(b)Qualifying Social Media Account: A qualifying social media account
is any account:
(i) operated solely by the defendant;
(ii) accessed by the defendant on at least 15 of the 30 days
immediately preceding communication of service under section (a); and
(iii) hosted on any communication platform designed to
transmit information electronically that does not have a systemic default operation of erasing shared information within
the time period for confirmation of receipt under section (c).
(c)Confirmation of Receipt of Service: Service under section (a) is confirmed through activity of the defendant that evidences receipt of the
summons, including, but not limited to: postings, or other response, by
the defendant, on the account served, referencing the content of the
summons, postings, or other response, by the defendant, on any other account (including a different social media account, email account, or
through other recorded communications), referencing the content of the
summons; erasing of the summons that can be attributed to the defendant; retransmission of the summons by the defendant; or the creation of
automated electronic receipts confirming that the defendant accessed the
summons or opened a link containing the summons. Confirmation of receipt of service must be made within 30 days of the delivery of service
under section (a). If confirmation of receipt of service is not made within
30 days of delivery of service under section (a), service of summons
must be made via first-class mail to the defendant’s last known address.
(d)Affidavit of Service: Proof of service must be made to the court
through a server’s affidavit. The server must affirm to the best of the
server’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:
(i) the account served was a qualified social media account
under section (b); and
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(ii) that service was confirmed under section (c). 316

3.

The Proposed Language Ensures the Service Will Be Directed to
the Defendant

To ensure that a service rule that permits service via social media without the need for case-by-case court approval passes constitutional muster,
the rule needs to ensure that service is provided to the correct defendant.
Under section (b), the service must be made to a social media account “operated solely by the defendant.” Because technology can obscure the identification of the defendant, the rule requires that the plaintiff take affirmative
steps to verify that the account being served is that of the defendant. Specifically, section (d) of the proposed rule mandates that the person accomplishing service perform a “reasonable inquiry” into the identity of the account
holder and requires that the server affirm in his affidavit that, “to the best of
the server’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances,” the account served is operated by the
named defendant.317 These are necessary steps for the server to be able to
affirm that the account served was a “qualified social media account” under
section (b) of the proposed rule.
In addition to this affirmation, the service provision318 could require the
server to provide detailed information about how the defendant’s identity
was confirmed and append supporting documentation. Examples of information could include the following: cross-reference to known information
about the defendant (including personal information, background, and other
electronic accounts known to be used by the defendant); images of the defendants; virtual associations between the defendant and others known to
associate with the defendant in real life; and patterns of behavior on the so-

316. A jurisdiction adopting the proposed language would also need to determine the date
by which service will be deemed to be made. To accommodate service via social media,
current timing provisions might need to be amended. For example, service via social media
may be considered made when confirmation of receipt of service is made by defendant action
or by mail (whichever occurs later). See N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT LAW § 309 (McKinney
2000) (designating the timing of service under snail and mail as being complete when the
later of the posting or mailing occurs). Alternatively, service may be deemed made when the
service of affidavit is filed. Regardless of approach, the jurisdiction should attempt to utilize
current timing provisions to the extent possible.
317. This language mirrors that of FED. R. CIV. P. 11. Like Rule 11, this aspect of the
proposal requires the affiant to make a reasonable inquiry before certifying the service in an
attempt to dissuade fraudulent service.
318. This aspect of the proposal could also be accomplished through modification of the
court’s forms for the server’s affidavit.
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cial media tool by the defendant that can be corroborated as the defendant’s
use.319
In addition to requiring some process to verify the identity of the defendant, section (b) of the proposed service rule requires that the account be
operated “solely” by the defendant. Because many social media platforms
enable multiple users to create jointly-held accounts,320 there is a chance that
service made on the social media platform will not be sufficiently directed at
the defendant. When service is made on an individual residing in the defendant’s physical dwelling, the server must ensure that the dwelling is that
of the defendant and that the person served also uses the dwelling as her
own residence. Similar reasoning should apply to service on a social media
account. Service must be directed to the defendant’s own account—just as
service must be directed to the defendant’s own dwelling. However, unlike
service on a dwelling, where the service can be provided to a joint-occupant,
information delivered to a jointly held account cannot be presumed to be
shared with the defendant, as it would be in a physical dwelling. There are
less norms governing how people interact with each other when jointly sharing a social media account than with people jointly occupying a dwelling.
For example, it is unclear whether information delivered to the jointly
owned social media account will be shared between the account-holders.
Therefore, service under this statutory option, should not be made on an
account known to be jointly held by more than one user.
4.

The Proposed Language Ensures the Service Will Be Conspicuous
and Will Apprise the Defendant of His Opportunity to Be Heard

To ensure that the service is “reasonably calculated to inform” the defendant in this virtual forum, section (a) of the proposed service rule requires service to be sufficiently “conspicuous.” Not every user of social media makes regular use of his account. The inconsistent use of social media
by account holders warrants a more circumscribed rule when there is no
judicial pre-approval of the service method. While others have suggested
that service could be provided on any account (or electronic medium) that
319. Courts have considered these factors in approving service via email and or social
media. Rio Properties v. Rio Intern. Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2002); Lipenga v. Kambalame, No. GJH-14-3980, 2015 WL 9484473, at *4 (D. Md. Dec. 28, 2015);
WhosHere, Inc. v. Orun, No. 1:13-CV-00526-AJT, 2014 WL 670817 at *4 (E.D. Va. Feb. 20,
2014); and F.T.Comm’n. v. PCCare247 Inc., No. 12 CIV. 7189 PAE, 2013 WL 841037, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013); Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 714-15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2015)..
320. For example, Facebook permits “pages” that are used for groups such as businesses
or brands. It can also be used by celebrities that want a different type of interactivity with
fans. What is a Facebook page? FACEBOOK: HELP CTR., (last visited June 25, 2016),
https://www.facebook.com/help/174987089221178.
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was “accessed by the defendant within 60 days” of the delivery of service,321
such a measure would not provide assurance that the service will be sufficiently conspicuous to bring home notice in a “reasonably calculated” way.
Service would be “reasonably calculated to inform” the defendant if the
defendant makes regular use of the social media account.
Because this article has argued that service on a social media account
can be likened to service at one’s dwelling, the service rule should more
closely mirror that form of service. Therefore, the account holder must utilize his social media account in such a manner as to make it a place where
he can regularly and reliably be found—something akin to his virtual dwelling. For purposes of service on one’s dwelling, most service rules require
that the dwelling be a “usual place of abode” or a “primary residence.”322 To
be considered a “dwelling,” the defendant must be more than just “passing
through.”323 In the context of a social media account, presence should be
measured both in terms of frequency (e.g., how many days the defendant
uses the account over a set period of time) and activity (e.g., how the defendant engages with the account). To ensure the service rules adequately
protect the defendant’s right to notice, the defendant should make frequent
use of the page in a measurable way.324 Section (a) of the proposed service
rule requires that the defendant make use of his account on fifteen of the
thirty days immediately preceding the service. The types of activity that
should count are any interaction with the account that demonstrates his use
of the platform (including posting, sharing, commenting, deleting, or otherwise reacting to content). The server is required to affirm, in his affidavit of
service under section (d), that the defendant is this type of regular user.
5.

The Proposed Language Ensures the Social Media Account Has
the Capacity to Bring Home Notice

One challenge transmission of service via social media presents is that
the content must be delivered in an electronic format. To minimize the
chance that the defendant will not be able to access the actual electronic files
that contain the summons and complaint, section (a) of the proposed service
rule mandates delivery in a “readily accessible format.” This language focuses on the policy behind the rule—that the defendant should be able to
easily access the contents of the service. The proposed rule uses flexible
321. Hedges, supra note 35, at 74–76.
322. Korpela, supra note 46 at §2(a) (summarizing service on the defendant’s dwelling).
323. Id.
324. See Melodie M. Dan, Social Networking Sites: A Reasonably Calculated Method to
Effect Service of Process, 1 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 183, 216–18 (2010) (recommending courts consider whether the defendant had logged onto his account within two
weeks of the motion for alternative service of process).

612

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

terms, rather than a specific file type, to account for the variety of ways this
could be achieved. For example, the service could be provided in a universally readable format325 or in a format that is universally exchanged on that
social media platform. If the defendant makes regular use of the platform, he
should have ways to access the files regularly exchanged on the platform.
Alternatively, a court using e-filing could modify the e-filing system to
permit service of process. For example, the plaintiff could be required to
provide the defendant with the information traditionally contained in the
summons—the name of the court, the date by which defendant must respond
and the consequence of failure to respond—and then provide a link to the
summons and complaint in the court’s e-filing system.326 As drafted, the
proposed language allows for many different types of electronic communication while still requiring that the service provided gives the defendant
notice of his opportunity to be heard and permits him to deliver the notice to
his lawyer to facilitate his ability to respond to the claims against him.
Another challenge for service via social media is the potential that the
social media platform has a default operation to automatically erase information after it is viewed.327 There is always some concern that a message
will be filtered, either by the platform or the account holder, to a lessconspicuous part of the social media platform. 328 These challenges can be
addressed by putting confirmation safeguards in place that seek to ensure
that the defendant receives the notice. However, platforms that are designed,
by default, to erase information transmitted to the account holder, present
unique constitutional challenges. For these platforms, unless the account
holder takes affirmative steps to capture and save the information, it will be
lost. Service provided through these channels is likely to be lost, minimizing
the chance that the defendant will be apprised of his opportunity to be heard
and eliminating his ability to transmit the notice to his lawyer. Therefore,
section (b) excludes such platforms as acceptable vehicles for service of
process.
A final aspect of social media platforms that must be considered is the
way in which information can be shared. Because many platforms have both
generalized pathways (those which provide for information sharing in a
325. Service should be made through files that can be read regardless of the operating
system, software, and hardware being accessed by the defendant.
326. See Case, supra note 309, at 1122–24 (recommending a court database to facilitate
service via electronic service of process).
327. For example, SnapChat operates with a default operation that erases shared information shortly after it is received by the recipient. Retrieve a copy of a snap, SNAPCHAT
SUPPORT, (last visited June 25, 2016) https://support.snapchat.com/en-US/a/snap-content
(discussing the limitations of SnapChat).
328. See supra Section V.A.2.d (discussing methods to ensure service is received by the
defendant).
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more public way) and individualized pathways (those which provide for
information sharing between the sender and recipient only or between a
small group of people), the service rule should aim to accommodate the various forms of operation while ensuring the notice is sufficiently conspicuous
to apprise the defendant of his rights. This can be achieved in section (a) by
requiring that the service be displayed in a “conspicuous manner” on the
defendant’s social media account. Such a requirement permits a variety of
transmissions while aiming to ensure the best option is chosen. For example,
conspicuous service could include postings that most closely resemble private messages, as these might alert the account holder of the message. Additionally, this could include posts to an account holder’s page, like his Facebook wall, that were sufficiently prominent. Service that would not likely
satisfy this standard would include the burying of the summons and complaint in unrelated messaging. For example, service posted as a comment to
other posts on an account holder’s Facebook wall would not be “conspicuous” as there would likely be no distinguishing feature of such post to bring
it to the attention of the account holder. Because a defendant could later
challenge the “conspicuousness” of a posting, the plaintiff would have a
sufficient incentive to transmit the service in a conspicuous manner.
6.

The Confirmation of Delivery Increases the Likelihood the Defendant Will Receive Notice

As an additional safeguard to ensure service is sufficiently conspicuous, section (c) requires that the service be verified in some manner, and if it
cannot be verified within thirty days of service, that another method of service be used as a backup. Under section (c), service is valid when there is
some activity by the defendant that demonstrates his receipt of the service.
This would operate similarly to limits placed on service via mail, which
often require a signature upon delivery. Examples of activity which operate
as a verification of receipt include comment on the service; forwarding or
sharing of the service; electronically tracked receipt of the service (by a read
receipt or the tracking of the opening of a link); and even deletion of the
service by the defendant (so long as it was apparent that the deletion was
due to an affirmative act of the defendant and not an automated response of
the platform).
In lieu of a verification of receipt via defendant conduct, section (c) requires delivery of service via first class mail to the defendant’s last known
address. To promote efficiency, this back-up option is required only when
service cannot be confirmed via the defendant’s activity within thirty days
after the service via social media is made. However, for jurisdictions that are
more apprehensive about service via social media, this back-up option might
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be required simultaneously with the service via social media.329 Notably,
because the recommended back-up method is only first class mail, this additional step would not be overly cumbersome to the plaintiff nor operate to
nullify the advantages of providing service via social media.
B.

Proposed Legislative “Non-Automatic” Routes to Service via Social
Media

This section presents additional legislative solutions for service of process via social media. Unlike the initial proposal that permits service of process as long as the conditions of the statute are met, these solutions condition service on pre-approval by the court or the consent of the defendant.
For jurisdictions hesitant to embrace service of process via social media,
these proposals may provide important intermediate steps towards achieving
service of process via social media. Moreover, these proposals would be
helpful in instances where the defendant is difficult to serve through traditional methods of service and does not otherwise meet the strict requirements of the proposed “automatic” route to service via social media.
1.

Proposed Legislation: Service Conditioned on Court Approval

The following proposed service rule permits the plaintiff to move the
court to order service of process via social media.
(a)Motion for Substituted Service of Process via Social Media: Upon
motion, a court may order service of process via a social media account,
maintained by the individual defendant, and hosted on any communication platform designed to transmit information electronically, if the court
determines that the proposed service is reasonably calculated to apprise
the defendant of the opportunity to be heard after considering the following:
(1) whether the account is operated solely by defendant or in
conjunction with others;
(2) whether the defendant has made substantial prior use of
the account;
(3) whether the proposed communication of service would be
sufficiently conspicuous, considering the defendant’s prior
use of the account and the operation of the platform;

329. See Dan, supra note 324 at 216 (recommending that service via social media “should
be supplemented with another inexpensive and reliable method of service, such as postal
mail, to increase the likelihood that a defendant will receive notice of a lawsuit”).
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(4) whether the defendant had accessed or used the account in
connection with the underlying dispute;
(5) whether the defendant’s receipt of the summons could be
verified; and
(6) whether service of the defendant through traditional
methods would be impossible or impracticable.

Under the proposed conditional service rule, a plaintiff may move the
court to order service via social media. The proposed rule then mandates
that the court consider a variety of factors330 when determining whether to
grant a motion to serve a defendant via social media. The factors should be
balanced together with no factor receiving more weight than any other. Additionally, the court need not find that every factor would support the motion. Rather, the court should find that, on balance, the factors favor the use
of a social media platform to provide service. The listed factors should be
interpreted in a manner consistent with the discussion included in Part IV of
this article.
Just as through the “automatic” route to service, the social media account must be that of the named defendant. However, unlike in the “automatic” route, the court may order service to a social media account that is
not operated solely by the defendant. The court must consider “whether the
account is operated solely by defendant or in conjunction with others.”
There may be instances where a defendant maintains a social media account
with another person or persons, and there is good reason to believe the defendant would learn of any service posted to the account. While these types
of accounts would not qualify under the “automatic” service provision, a
court could examine the attributes of the social media account and the use of
the account by the defendant to ensure that service would reach the defendant.

330. David Bell, Texas Bill Would Make Service via Facebook Law, HAYNES & BOONE
BLOGS, (March 1, 2013) http://blogs.haynesboone.com/index.php/2013/03/firm/firm/texasbill-would-make-service-via-facebook-the-law/ (In 2013, Texas House Bill 1989 proposed to
permit service via social media upon court approval. Texas House Bill 1989 provided the
most guidance to courts of any proposal to date, directing courts to consider whether the
defendant “regularly accessed” the social media account and whether the defendant “could
reasonably be expected to receive actual notice” through service on the defendant’s social
media account. Even Texas House Bill 1989, however, did not give specific guidance to the
court on what “regular access” by the defendant would look like or how to assess the reasonability of one’s expectation that the defendant would receive actual notice through the
proposed service. Ultimately Texas House Bill 1989 was not enacted into law); see also,
Tabibi, supra note 141, at 54–56 (discussing Texas House Bill 1989).
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The defendant’s use of the account and the capacity of the platform
must be considered. These factors ensure that courts determine whether the
defendant is likely to be apprised of the service because he will be likely to
visit and retrieve the service, and because the social media platform enables
the service to be conspicuously displayed.331 A court can make this determination by considering the nature of the defendant’s “prior use of the account,” including “whether the defendant had accessed or used the account
in connection with the underlying dispute.” As observed by courts that have
permitted service via social media, when a defendant that has made use of
social media on prior occasions, especially to communicate with the plaintiff
or others in connection with the matters that form the basis of the case, there
is reasonable assurance that the defendant will be made aware of the service.332 After all, he has already “expressed” a preference for receiving important information (or at least information from the plaintiff) via this method.
Several state “catch-all” service provisions permit a court to order service through any method, so long as it comports with the Constitution. This
proposal differs in significant ways from these “catch-all” provisions. First,
unlike most “catch-all” provisions, the proposed language does not require
the plaintiff to make a showing that service was not possible or practicable
under traditional methods of service. While the proposal includes this as a
factor to consider, the proposed rule does not require this initial showing.
Some plaintiffs might need to resort to service via social media even
when there are substantial reasons to believe the defendant will in fact receive the service. For example, a defendant might make regular use of his
social media account, but have more clustered activity and not, therefore,
have verifiable use of his account in fifteen of the last thirty days preceding
the proposed service. While this would disqualify use of the proposed “automatic” route to service, the court could examine the defendant’s use of his
social media account and determine that service would be “reasonably cal-

331. When considering the capacity of the social media platform, the court should consider whether it will permit for the exchange of information in a universally readable format
or can permit the transmission of a link to the court’s e-filing system with the ability to obtain
the information needed to apprise the defendant of his opportunity to be heard on the matters
against him. Also, the court should consider whether the platform has a default mechanism
that deletes shared information prior to the date by which the defendant must respond.
332. Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 716 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) (relying on
defendant’s prior use of Facebook to communicate with the plaintiff to validate the defendant’s Facebook account); F.T.Comm’n v. PCCare247 Inc., No. 12 CIV. 7189 (PAE), 2013
WL 841037, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013) (considering the defendant’s prior use of email
and Facebook before ordering service); see also Rio Properties v. Rio Int’l. Interlink, 284
F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing the defendant’s prior use of email as support for
granting service via email).
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culated to apprise the defendant” of his opportunity to appear and defend
himself.
By contrast, other plaintiffs may be inclined to motion the court for
service via social media because, after considering all other methods of service, it becomes clear that the defendant will be difficult to physically locate
or that he is actively evading service. For these defendants, service via social media would be warranted because it is “not substantially less likely”
than any other method to bring home notice. The proposed service rule must
be sufficiently flexible to permit the court to order service via social media
in either circumstance, as both are constitutionally sound.
Second, the proposed factor-based test is superior to the traditional
“catch-all” provisions as those provisions give little to no guidance to courts
in determining whether service via social media is appropriate in a given
case. With more guidance, the court can be assured that it has considered the
unique constitutional challenges presented by service of process via social
media. Additionally, requiring courts to consider listed factors creates consistent treatment in the handling of motions for service via social media.
This, in turn, promotes the development of a uniform application of this
important due process right.
2.

Waiver of Service Provisions

The final proposal in this section provides an opportunity to seek consent from the defendant to service of process via social media. This specific
proposal is fashioned off of the waiver of service provisions contained in the
FRCP, though any state could adopt or modify a similar waiver provision.
The federal waiver provision permits a plaintiff to request that the defendant
waive his right to formal service of the summons.333 The plaintiff must deliver a copy of the complaint to the defendant along with the request to
waive service and a prepaid method for the defendant to respond.334 Under
this process, if the defendant agrees to waive formal service of the summons
he gains additional time to answer and the plaintiff need not move forward
with formal service.335
It could be argued that the current FRCP waiver provisions already
permit waiver to be delivered via methods such as social media. Arguably,
FRCP 4(d)(1)(G), which states that the waiver may be delivered “by firstclass mail or other reliable means,”336 already includes delivery of the waiv333. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d).
334. Id. at 4(d)(1)(C); see Wavier of the Service of Summons Form, U.S. Courts,
http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/notice-lawsuit-summons-subpoena/waiver-service-summons,
(last visited June 25, 2016).
335. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(3).
336. Id. at 4(d)(1)(G).
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er via social media. However, it is not clear if everyone agrees that social
media constitutes a “reliable means” through which to deliver a request for
waiver of process.337 At a minimum, the waiver rule should be clarified to
dispel this confusion.
Another wrinkle under the current waiver of service language in Rule 4
is the requirement under subsection 4(d)(1)(C) that the request for waiver
form must “be accompanied by a copy of the complaint, 2 copies of the
waiver form appended to this Rule 4, and a prepaid means for returning the
form.”338 Those who argue that social media is not an available method to
deliver a request for waiver of service point to this provision, arguing that
there is no process by which to deliver a prepaid means to deliver the signed
waiver.
The current waiver of service rules contained in Rule 4 could easily be
modified to clarify that waiver of service can be accomplished via social
media. First, Rule 4(d)(1)(G)339 should be modified to specifically include
delivery via social media. For example, the provision should read:
The notice and request must: . . . (G) be sent by first-class mail or other
reliable means, including through social media or other reliable electronic methods of communication.340

This additional language would remove any remaining doubt that social media provides a reliable means of delivery of the request for waiver of
service.
Second, a version of Rule 4(d)(1)(C) should be adopted which accounts
for delivery of a request for waiver of service via a non-paper-copy method.
For example, the current phrasing refers to the need to deliver two copies of
the waiver form.341 Presumably, this is to allow the defendant to retain one
copy for himself and to return the other to the plaintiff without carrying the
burden of making extra copies. In a digital context, there is no burden associated with making additional copies. Further, the reference to providing a
prepaid means of returning the signed waiver to the plaintiff is because the
337. See Hedges, supra note 35, at 75 (recommending the FRCP be amended to clearly
provide for delivery of the waiver of service be sent via any electronic means).
338. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1)(C).
339. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1)(G).
340. See Hedges, supra note 35, at 74–75. (proposing that waiver provisions should be
expanded to permit transmission of the request to waive through any electronic means). This
article proposes making delivery of the request to waiver possible via social media. However,
a jurisdiction could adopt broad waiver provisions. There is less concern about the reliability
of the method chosen for delivery of the request to waive service of the summons. The plaintiff must complete formal service if the waiver is not signed and returned by the defendant,
incentivizing the plaintiff to choose the most reliable means available for delivery of the
request to waive service.
341. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1)(C).
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Rule was initially designed to operate in a paper-copy context. The prepaid
return presumes that the defendant will use some form of mailing service to
return the form to the plaintiff. With the ease by which a person can add his
signature to an electronic document and send that document back to the
plaintiff, the language needs to be adjusted to reflect the digital context. As
long as the context does not create an additional burden (like the expense of
mailing a signed waiver form to the plaintiff), it meets the spirit of Rule 4.
To clarify the Rule and avoid any perception that it might prohibit the
transmission of waiver of service via social media, the Rule should read as
follows:
The notice and request must: . . . (C) be accompanied by a hard-copy or
digital copy of the complaint, 2 hard-copies or 1 digital copy of the
waiver form appended to this Rule 4, and, if delivered in hard-copy, a
prepaid means for returning the a hard-copy form.

With these changes, Rule 4 would operate to provide for delivery of a
waiver of service as it has when that waiver has been transmitted in hard
copy. When delivered via social media, the defendant would still have the
same time to return the signed waiver form. The digital waiver form signed
by the defendant could be transmitted by any electronic method (including
social media or email) or could be filed on the court’s e-filing system. To
clarify the process and ensure that the plaintiff receives the signed waiver
(and avoids the expense of attempting traditional service of process), the
waiver of service form could be modified to include a provision where the
plaintiff could designate how the signed form should be returned. For example, the form could include a line that specifies where and how the signed
waiver is to be returned, including appropriate links to the court e-filing
system or to a designated email or social media account. Finally, the waiver
of service process would continue to provide the incentives for the defendant to waive, including additional time to file his answer and the potential
award of costs when he refuses to waive in bad faith. The plaintiff would
also continue to be obligated to turn to another method of service of process
if the waiver is not returned in the designated time.
C.

Service of Process Under Current Catch-All Provisions

Until such time as service rules can be adopted, which provide clear
routes to service of process via social media, some states may continue to
permit service via social media on a case-by-case basis under “catch-all”
provisions. As discussed in this article, some states permit courts to fashion
service methods on a case-by-case basis so long as the approved method
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meets the Mullane test.342 While the court is empowered to reach its own
decision on whether service via social media is warranted, they are often
hesitant to grant these motions.343 Either courts deny the plaintiff’s request
outright, or require some additional method of service be utilized simultaneous with the service via social media.344 The considerations raised in this
article can be drawn upon to remove some of the uncertainty for courts wading into this new and uncertain terrain in notice law.
Courts operating under “catch-all” service provisions should rely on
the same factors identified in the proposed legislative provision articulated
in Section V.A.3. of this article. Because plaintiffs in these jurisdictions are
operating without a favored route to service of process via social media,
courts should be mindful that the plaintiff may be motioning the court for a
method of service that might be the most likely to bring home notice. As
such, the court might consider whether the defendant would otherwise meet
the strict requirements of the proposed “automatic” route to service of process via social media set forth in this article. When faced with these facts,
courts should not require additional service via alternate methods. Such a
requirement creates an additional burden on the plaintiff while offering little
additional protection for the defendant’s due process rights.
VI. POSSIBLE CHALLENGES TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSED
LEGISLATION
This section addresses some of the impediments a state might encounter when attempting to revise its current service of process rules to implement the proposed legislation offered in this article. In addition to raising
these concerns, this section offers some suggestions to assist in the implementation of the proposed legislation.
A.

Lawyers, Judges, and Legislators May Not Be Familiar with the Operation of Social Media Platforms

One challenge to the implementation of the proposed legislation is the
lack of familiarity many lawyers have of social media platforms. In particular, lawyers and judges lack familiarity with the operation of newer forms of
social media. Lawyers and judges may attribute this to ethical limitations
342. See supra Section II.B.
343. Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, No. 11 CIV. 6608 JFK, 2012 WL 2086950, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012) (noting that the request to permit service via Facebook was “unorthodox”).
344. F.T.Comm’n. v. PCCare247 Inc., No. 12 CIV. 7189 (PAE), 2013 WL 841037, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013) (emphasizing the need to couple service via social media with service by email).
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imposed by a variety of local bar associations or state supreme courts on use
of social media. In jurisdictions with more ambiguous ethics rules regarding
the use of social media, the fear of possibly violating professional ethics
rules may create a substantial disincentive for lawyers and judges to use, and
thereby become familiar with, social media.345 When this understandable
reluctance to use social media is coupled with the fast-paced evolution of
these tools, the lack of familiarity becomes a true encumbrance for those
seeking to have social media adopted as a method of service. Finally, there
is a long-standing acceptance of service conveyed in a hard-copy form. Because lawyers have long embraced the significance of formal service, it may
be difficult for them to embrace new (and less familiar) methods.
To overcome the feelings of unfamiliarity, those seeking to encourage
service via social media should ground the discussion in the principles of
due process. By focusing on the underlying principles of due process, the
decision on whether and how to implement service via social media will be
premised on the constitutional right to notice and not on the operation of any
particular social media platform. This serves to center lawyers and judges in
more familiar territory and avoids the possibility that any proposed solution
will be too dependent on a particular view of social media. Moreover, those
advocating for service via social media should capitalize on the movement
towards e-filing in the federal courts and in many state systems. As lawyers
and judges begin to embrace an electronic system, they may be more inclined to embrace service via electronic medium.
B.

Limitations on “Who” Is Authorized to Provide Service

One practical limitation to consider in using social media platforms as
a vehicle for service is the accessibility of the account by a “would be” server. While anyone can register for an account on a social media platform,
most platforms limit access to any individual account holder’s page. For
example, account holders may need to accept or approve a request to interact with the server before any information can be shared. Each social media
platform operates in different ways; some require an approved connection
before sharing of information via individual pathways (like private messaging options) and others require an approved connection before sharing of

345. Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 711 n.2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) (noting that
members of the New York State judiciary were not likely to be among the 157,000,000 people who check their Facebook accounts daily); see also John G. Browning, Keep Your
“Friends” Close and Your Enemies Closer: Walking the Ethical Tightrope in the Use of
Social Media, 3 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 204 (2013) (discussing the ethical
challenges lawyers face when using social media in the context of litigation).
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information on even more generalized pathways (like posts on a Facebook
wall).
Connected with this limitation is the limit placed on who may serve the
defendant under the jurisdiction’s service rules. While many state service
rules broadly define “who” may serve a summons on the defendant, some
impose significant limitations requiring service to be made by a sheriff or
licensed official. These types of limitations may minimize the efficiency
offered by service via social media. For example, if a party needs to hire the
sheriff or a private licensed server, it might be costly for the server to gather
the information needed to validate the defendant’s social media account. In
addition to generating extra expense, the process of validating a defendant’s
social media account might prove to be too cumbersome for a sheriff (or
other official server).
In considering the adoption of the proposed legislation presented in this
article, additional revision to a state’s service rules may be warranted. For
example, the state could consider permitting more individuals to serve a
summons via social media. To enhance the reliability of service by these
individuals, the state could require more information to be provided in the
affidavit of service and could encourage the enforcement of penalties for
knowingly submitting a falsified affidavit.346
Another hurdle to effectuating service via social media that might not
be apparent when considering the language of the statute, is the practical and
ethical limitations on “who” can serve a summons. Even in a state that permits service by anyone over the age of 18 who is not a party to the suit, service might not be possible by lawyers or others due to ethical limitations on
their use of social media platforms. In states with broad service provisions,
lawyers can perform service. However, restrictions placed on the lawyer’s
use of the opposing party’s social media account may make this impossible.
One can consider New York’s service rules to understand the potential
hurdle ethics limitations pose to service via social media. New York’s service rules permit any non-party over the age of eighteen to serve a defendant, including an attorney.347 The New York State Bar Association’s Social
Media Ethics Guidelines provide guidance on how a lawyer may review a
person’s social media page; a critical step to serving a defendant through his
social media account. While these guidelines explain that a lawyer may

346. In addition to contempt of court and statutory penalties, some jurisdictions recognize
legal claims against the server. See Michael Geibelson, Serving Process on the Process Server, ROBINS KAPLAN BLOG, (Oct. 1, 1998), http://www.robinskaplan.com/resources/articles/ser
ving-process-on-the-process-server (discussing a wide range of penalties available when a
server files a false affidavit).
347. Baidoo, 5 N.Y.S.3d at 716 (ordering the attorney to perform service by accessing the
plaintiff’s social media account).
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view the public portion of a represented person’s social media account,348
the lawyer may not view a private portion of the social media account unless
the represented person has furnished an express authorization.349 Moreover,
the lawyer cannot have another person access a represented person’s social
media account in a manner that the lawyer is prohibited from doing himself.350 While the lawyer can request access to a private portion of an unrepresented person’s social media account, the lawyer must “use her full name
and an accurate profile, and she may not create a different or false profile in
order to mask her identity.”351
In jurisdictions with more restricted use of social media accounts, a
lawyer may not be able to provide service via social media because he (or
his agents) might not be able to access the individual’s account to verify the
account and receipt of service. While jurisdictions like New York provide
more latitude to lawyers accessing unrepresented person’s accounts (a typical scenario when initiating a lawsuit),352 some revision to the access of social media accounts of represented person’s accounts may be warranted. To
facilitate service via social media, ethics guidelines could be clarified to
account for the access of the social media account for the limited purpose of
serving the summons. For example, the ethics guidelines could specifically
exclude a private server as an “agent” of the lawyer – disconnecting the
server’s actions from the lawyer and enabling the private server to verify the
account through access to private aspects of the account (like a private messaging feature of the social media account).
A related issue arises in jurisdictions that offer little to no guidance on
how lawyers are to ethically use social media accounts of opposing parties.
The lack of guidance acts as a deterrence to otherwise appropriate use of the
defendant’s social media account. In such jurisdictions, the ethics rules
should be clarified to permit lawyers to access public and private aspects of
an unrepresented person’s social media account for the purpose of performing service of summons, so long as they do so in a manner that is not deceptive.353
C.

Potential for Abuse or Need to Limit Public Nature of Notice

While service via social media provides an efficient and reliable method to serve many defendants, there are some situations where this method
348. Social Media Ethics Guidelines,
http://www.nysba.org/socialmediaguidelines/.
349. Id. at 17.
350. Id. at 18.
351. Id. at 16.
352. Baidoo, 5 N.Y.S.3d at 716.
353. See Browning, supra note 345.
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might be abused by plaintiffs who are disinterested with providing defendants with sufficient service. For example, courts may refuse to enforce
waiver of service provisions in contracts when there is a power-imbalance
between the contracting parties.354 This restriction on limiting service method options arises out of a concern that the landlord and tenant are not in
equal bargaining power, such that the waiver of service or limitation on the
method is not valid. States may identify other types of claims that raise similar concerns in the context of service via social media. Further, there are
situations where the litigation process itself might be prone to abuse and
statutes have been enacted to protect the rights of would-be defendants. For
example, the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act could be interpreted to
prohibit the collector from publically posting notice to a debtor on a Facebook account.355 To account for these situations, the proposed legislative
solutions contained in this article could include the following caveat clause:
“unless state [or federal] law provides otherwise, an individual may be
served. . . .” With such an exclusion, the jurisdiction would be able to limit
the use of service via social media when it deems the balance to tip in favor
of excluding this method.
While the above examples focus on a jurisdiction’s desire to limit service methods for a particular group of vulnerable defendants, there may be
instances in which an individual plaintiff attempts to give flawed service via
social media, rendering a particular defendant in need of protection. For
example, the plaintiff might choose an inconspicuous place to post the service on the social media account to obtain a default judgment. While the
defendant can move to vacate the default judgment on the grounds that the
notice was not compliant with the service rules, this can be a costly and unnerving process for the defendant. To prevent this type of conduct by plaintiffs, the service rule or statute could include a provision for the award of
costs associated with a successful motion to vacate a default judgment when
there is a finding that the service was provided in bad faith. These costs
could be levied against the plaintiff and/or his legal counsel. Additionally,
the penalties suggested above for knowingly filing a false affidavit of service could be instituted. These penalties could act in concert to deter the
party, lawyer, and service provider from using the service rule to provide
“bad” notice. Finally, additional penalties may be warranted when a plaintiff
has provided “bad” service via social media in multiple cases. For example,
the court may make a finding that a plaintiff has made repeated flawed ser354. Stephanie Francis Ward, Our Pleasure to Serve You: More Lawyers Look to Social
Networking Sites to Notify Defendants, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 1, 2011, 8:49 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/our_pleasure_to_serve_lawyers_social_network
ing_sites_notify_defendants/ (discussing limits on service in the context of landlord-tenant
disputes).
355. Id.
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vice via social media in more than one case and order that the plaintiff be
precluded from using the service via social media provisions without prior
approval of court.356
VII. CONCLUSION
The way in which we receive information is in a state of rapid change,
brought about in large part by the growth of social media. These technological leaps forward have created the potential to transform some of our most
traditional legal processes, including the method by which we deliver service of process. Our legal systems should be “legally hacked,”357and we
should capitalize on the opportunities created by technology, especially
when the use of technology will enable our legal processes to better conform
to the constitutional principles on which they were built.

356. For example, states could enact provisions regulating a plaintiff who has been found
to use repeated bad service in a manner similar to vexatious litigant statutes. See OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2323.52 (West 2016).
357. See LEGAL HACKERS, supra note 16 (describing “legal hacking” as a cultural reference to the growing movement to find creative solutions to problems that lie at the intersection of law and technology).

